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BSA/AML Penalties List

Below we have collected information on recent monetary penalties assessed and C&D Orders imposed by FinCEN or federal and state financial institution regulators (and others) for deficiencies in BSA/AML programs. The cases are arranged in reverse chronological order, and include the name and asset size (when known) of the organization penalized, stated penalty amount, agencies involved, and key shortcomings noted in the organization's AML or BSA compliance program.

Penalties against selected individuals and non-bank organizations are included to help illustrate the breadth of the term "financial institution" in federal anti-money laundry law and Treasury regulations, and the fact that individuals may be accountable, as well. These entries may also prove helpful as bankers try to "drive home" the need for compliance with MSB customers and others.

Key to Abbreviations
  • DOJ - U.S. Department of Justice
  • FDIC - Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
  • Fed - Federal Reserve System
  • FinCEN - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
  • FINRA - Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (private sector)
  • NCUA - National Credit Union Administration
  • OCC - Office of Comptroller of the Currency
  • OTS - Office of Thrift Supervision (Links to OTS source documents are no longer available)
  • SEC - Securities and Exchange Commission
  • K - Thousand
  • M - Million
  • B - Billion



2011 and earlier



6/26/2014–Associated Bank, N.A., Green Bay, Wisconsin
$500K CMP Agencies: OCC Total Assets $24.5 B (3/31/2014)

Associated Bank, N.A., Green Bay, Wisconsin, is a federally-chartered commercial bank with 247 offices located in Illinois, Minnesota, Virginia and Wisconsin. The OCC identified BSA/AML deficiencies that occurred primarily during 2010-2012, and issued a Consent Order on February 23, 2012, which in part required the bank to undertake remedial actions with respect to its BSA/AML compliance program. The Consent Order was terminated on March 11, 2014. The OCC on June 26, 2014, issued a Consent Order for a $500,000 civil money penalty in connection with the 2010-2012 deficiencies, which were described in the Order as follows:

  1. the Bank failed to (i) conduct adequate risk assessments, (ii) conduct sufficient customer due diligence, (iii) properly identify high-risk customers, and (iv) implement an adequate suspicious activity monitoring system;
  2. the Bank's independent testing of the Bank's BSA/AML compliance program was inadequate;
  3. the Bank's BSA officer and staff lacked the necessary resources and expertise, including knowledge of regulatory requirements;
  4. the Bank's BSA training efforts for staff were inadequate; and
  5. after conducting a lookback, the Bank filed 670 new Suspicious Activity Reports.



4/23/2014–New Milenium Cash Exchange, Inc. and Flor Angella Lopez, Miami, Florida
$10K CMP Agencies: FinCEN Total Assets Unknown

FinCEN has assessed a civil money penalty of $10,000 against New Milenium Cash Exchange, Inc. (NMCE) and its owner, Flor Angella Lopez, for multiple violations of BSA/AML regulations. FinCEN found that NMCE operated as a "financial institution" and "money services business" as those terms are defined in 31 CFR §§ 1010.100(t) and (ff). Since 2006, three IRS exams of NMCE identified repeated violations of the BSA. The Florida Office of Financial Regulation also examined NMCE and found violations resulting in a written corrective action agreement and a fine in 2011. FinCEN determined that MNCE and Lopez willfully violated the BSA's program, reporting and recordkeeping requirements since at least 2008. NMCE and/or Lopez:

  • conducted business without continuous FinCEN registration for over three years
  • submitted MSB registrations in 2011 containing inaccurate information on services rendered by NMCE
  • failed to establish and implement an effective written anti-money laundering program
  • lacked adequate AML programs for check cashing and money order activities and currency exchange transactions
  • failed to have policies, procedures and internal controls to adequately verify the identity of persons conducting transactionsl to monitor for suspicious activity, to identify reportable currency transactions, or ensure the filing of CTRs
  • failed to make or retain adequate records
  • lacked a BSA/AML risk assessment
  • provided no or inadequate training
  • filed 51 CTRs covering transactions totaling about one milloin dollars significantly late
  • failed to file at least 149 CTRs for exchanges of currency with other financial institutions.



1/14/2014–Old National Bank, Evansville, Indiana
$500K CMP Agencies: OCC Total Assets (9/30/13: $9.5 Billion

Old National Bank is a Federally chartered bank headquarterd in Evansville, Indiana, with 200 domestic locations in 5 states in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan and Ohio. On January 14, 2014, the Comptroller issued a Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty of $500,000.

BSA/AML deficiencies were addressed in a Consent Order issued by the OCC on June 4, 2012, which in part required the bank to undertake remedial actions with respect to its BSA/AML program. In the 1/14/14 CMP Order, the OCC cited findings that

  • the bank failed to (1) conduct adequate risk assessments, (2) obtain more than the minimum information required for CIP purposes, (3) implement an adequate suspicious activity monitoring system, and (4) property identify high-risk customers.
  • the bank's internal audit review failed to identify the deficiencies in the program
  • the bank's BSA officer and staff lacked the necessary resources and expertise, including knowledge of regulatory requirements, and
  • after conducting a lookback, the bank filed 110 new SARs and 172 supplemental SARs.



1/7/2014–JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Columbus, OH, et al
$2.05 B CMPs and forfeiture Agencies: FinCEN, OCC, FRB, U.S. Atty for SDNY Holding Company assets $2.5 trillion

On January 7, 2014, news releases from FinCEN, the OCC, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) announced that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. and various affiliates had admitted to BSA reporting violations and other BSA/AML compliance program deficiencies. FinCEN announced that it has fined JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., $461 million for willfully violating the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) by failing to report suspicious transactions arising out of Bernard L. Madoff's decades-long, multi-billion dollar fraudulent investment scheme. "In consenting to the assessment of a civil money penalty, JPMorgan admitted to the facts set forth by FinCEN and that its conduct violated the Bank Secrecy Act," said the release. FinCEN said that the bank attempted to protect itself when it became suspicious of Madoff's fraud, but failed to file required Suspicious Activity Reports with FinCEN which might have "saved thousands of other fraud victims untold misery and loss." FinCEN's notice stated that the OCC will collect a $350 million payment under a Civil Money Penalty Order against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Bank and Trust Company, N.A., and Chase Bank USA, NA. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) has approved a two-year deferred prosecution agreement under which JPMorgan will forfeit $1.7 billion (which will be contributed to the recovery funds for Madoff victims). FinCEN agreed to consider its penalty satisfied by JPMorgan's payment to the SDNY. The combined payments agreed to by the JPMorgan banks total $2.05 billion.

Details of the admitted and alleged violations can be found in the press releases and orders:




9/24/2013–Saddle River Valley Bank, Saddle River, NJ
$4.1 M CMP; $4.1 M forfeiture Agencies: FinCEN, OCC, U.S. Atty for NJ $10 M (6/30/13)

On September 24, 2013, FinCEN announced that it had assessed a $4.1 million CMP against Saddle River Valley Bank in Saddle River, New Jersey (the bank has ceased operations and relocated its legal headquarters to Montclair, NJ). FinCEN determined that the bank violated several provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) from 2009 through May 2011. The Bank has consented to the assessment.

Following an investigation shared with the OCC and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, "FinCEN concluded that the bank willfully violated aspects of the BSA's program, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements by lacking an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program reasonably designed to manage the risks of money laundering and other illicit activity, failing to conduct adequate due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts, and failing to detect and adequately report in a timely manner suspicious activities in the accounts of foreign money exchange houses, also known as casas de cambio. The Bank executed $1.5 billion worth of inadequately monitored transactions on behalf of Mexican and Dominican casas de cambio despite publicly available information, such as a FinCEN advisory, that provided ample notice of the heightened risks of dealing with these institutions." FinCEN director Jennifer Shasky Calvery commented that it was remarkable that a community bank in suburban New Jersey would attract over a billion dollars in transactions by customers in Mexico and the Dominican Republic.

The OCC announced its issuance of a concurrent $4.1 million CMP order. The agency had issued a C&D order in October 2011, directing the bank to correct its deficient BSA/AML programs, and requiring an independent review of the bank's relationships with several casas de cambio. The review resulted in the delayed filing of more than 190 SARs. The FinCEN assessment order (see above) stated that a single payment of $4.1 million would satisfy both its order and the OCC's order.

The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey issued a related announcement of an agreement with the former bank to settle for an additional $4.1 million the civil complaint against the bank for BSA/AML violations. This settlement, taken with the concurrent CMPs imposed by FinCEN and the OCC, will exhaust almost all of the former bank's remaining assets.

The bank's violations are summarized as failing to

  • appropriately monitor at least $1.5 billion in transactions conducted on behalf of the CDCs
  • properly detect and report suspicious activity occurring within the CDC accounts and file Suspicious Activity Reports on a timely basis
  • conduct sufficient enhanced due diligence on the CDCs
  • have a BSA officer or other personnel with sufficient experience to operate an AML program
  • provide adequate training to its employees concerning anti-money laundering
  • retain qualified periodic independent testers for its anti-money laundering program, as required by the BSA



9/23/2013–TD Bank, N.A., Wilmington, DE
$52.5M CMPs, C&D Agencies: OCC, FinCEN, SEC Assets: $212B (6/30/13)

On September 23, 2013, the OCC announced a Consent Order for a $37.5 million Civil Money Penalty against TD Bank, N.A. FinCEN announced it had issued a concurrent $37.5 million CMP assessment, and the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a press release to announce a $15 million CMP and C&D against the bank, and its filing of charges against former bank regional vice president Frank A. Spinosa.

TD Bank is a $212 billion national bank with over 1,300 domestic offices in 16 states ranging from New England to Florida. The principal charges against the bank are that it failed to file a series of SARs relating to suspicious activity in connection with a $1.2 billion South Florida-based Ponzi scheme conducted by Scott Rothstein, who was sentenced to 50 years in prison for his involvement. According to the regulators, the bank's monitoring systems flagged activity in Rothstein's accounts on several occasions, but the bank failed to file SARs. In addition, according the SEC, the bank and Spinosa defrauded investors by producing misleading documents and making false statements about Spinosa's accounts and their balances.

In 2011, the Bank conducted a review of the Rothstein transactions. Based on the results of the review it filed five late suspicious activity reports, totaling an estimated $900 million in aggregate suspicious transaction activity occurring between April 2008 and October 2009. FinCEN said that a "lack of adequate training for both the anti-money laundering and business staff contributed to the failure to recognize this suspicious activity."



9/6/2013 - North Dade Community Development Federal CU, Miami Gardens, FL
C&D Agencies: NCUA Assets: $5.8 M; Members: 780

On September 6, 2013, the National Credit Union Administration issued a Consent Cease and Desist Order to North Dade Community Development Federal Credit Union, Miami Gardens, Florida (CU).

The CU is a federally chartered credit union with its only office located in Miami Gardens, Florida. According its last call report, it has approximately $5.8 million in total assets and 780 members. On September 6, 2013, the NCUA and the CU entered into a consent Cease and Desist Order under which the CU has been directed to:

  • within 30 days, stop transacting any business activity for all MSBs not located within the CU's geographic Field of Membership (FOM) limits
  • immediately start verifying that all persons or entities are within the FOM and eligible for membership in the CU before providing them membership or membership services
  • within 30 days, suspend transacting business for all member MSBs until the CU develops and implements an adequate BSA/AML/OFAC program
  • engage an individual or firm of BSA/AML/OFAC specialists acceptable to the NCUA Regional Director as a consultant to assist in correcting, at a minimum, the BSA/AML/OFAC program deficiencies identified in the Order
  • within 30 days, hire or designate a BSA Compliance Officer with the knowledge, experience, delegated authority and resources to ensure compliance with 12 CFR Part 748 and other applicable BSA/AML/OFAC laws and regulations
  • within 60 days, complete a comprehensive BSA/AML/OFAC risk assessment with the assistant of the consultant, and establish policy on the frequency of reviews and updates of the assessment. As part of the assessment, a list of high risk members must be established and maintained.
  • within 60 days, revise and document board approval of all policies relating to BSA, AML and OFAC (minimum criteria for such policies included in Order)
  • within 60 days, ensure that all staff and officials are adequately trained on the requirements of 12 CFR Part 748 and other applicable BSA/AML/OFAC laws and regulations, providing the NCUA Regional Director with copies of training materials and documentation of completion
  • within 90 days, develop a system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with Part 748 and all applicable BSA/AML/OFAC laws and regulations
  • conduct BSA/AML/OFAC compliance program testing
  • ensure that BSA/AML/OFAC testing is complete and results are reported to the CU's board of directors



6/28/2013 - TIAA-CREF Trust Company, FSB, St. Louis, MO
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (3/31/13): $2.3B

On June 28, 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued a Consent Cease and Desist Order to TIAA-CREF Trust Company, FSB, St. Louis, Missouri (Bank).

The Bank is a federally chartered savings bank with its only office located in St. Louis, Missouri. Its FDIC-reported financials for March 31, 2013, show a 236% growth in total assets over March 31, 2012 ($681 million to $2287 million), and a growth in staffing from 74 to 105 FTEs. The company was established in 1998.

The C&D Order has several articles requiring the bank's board to ensure it has competent management, a viable strategic plan, a capital plan, and improved management of its liquidity, funding concentration, interest rate risk and information security. Several articles, however, focus on BSA/AML concerns, requiring the bank to develop of put into place—

  1. a comprehensive BSA action plan
  2. a BSA risk assessment
  3. BSA independent testing
  4. BSA internal controls and high risk identification
  5. CDD and EDD information gathering
  6. a written program to ensure compliance with SAR filing requirements
  7. BSA training
  8. appropriate BSA compliance department staffing



6/17/2013 - M&T Bank Corporation and Manufacturers & Traders Trust Company, Buffalo, NY
Written Agreement Agencies: FRB Assets (12/31/12) of holding company: $83B

On June 17, 2013, the Federal Reserve Board released a Written Agreement with M&T Bank Corporation (M&T) and one of its subsidiaries, Manufaturers & Traders Trust Company (Bank), both of Buffalo, New York.

M&T is a bank holding company that also owns and controls various non-bank subsidiaries, including Wilmington Trust Company, Wilmington, Delaware (WTC). WTC voluntarily surrendered its FDIC insurance and became a non-bank in 2011. WTC provides a variety of products and services to private and institutional customers, including wealth advisory and foreign correspondent account services.

M&T had adopted a firm-wide compliance risk management program for its subsidiaries, including the Bank, designed to identify and manage compliance risks related to BSA and AML requirements. M&T also undertakes to conduct customer due diligence and transaction monitoring on behalf of its subsidiaries. The FRB of New York identified, in its most recent inspection of M&T, deficiencies in M&T's firm-wide compliance risk management program with respect to compliance with BSA/AML Requirements; the Bank's internal controls, customer due diligence procedures, and transaction monitoring processes with respect to compliance with BSA/AML Requirements; and WTC's due diligence practices for foreign correspondent accounts.

The Written Agreement requires that M&T adopt, submit and adhere to an acceptable revised written firm-wide BSA/AML compliance program that describes the specific actions that will be taken, including timelines for completion, to ensure compliance with applicable BSA/AML Requirements. Required elements of that program are spelled out, including the findings and recommendations of a consultant "recently engaged by M&T to assist in matters related to compliance with the BSA/AML Requirements."

The Bank agreed to engage an independent consultant to conduct a review of account and transaction activity associated with high--risk customer accounts from 7/1/12 to 12/31/12, to determine whether suspicious activity was appropriately reported. The Reserve Bank may order similar reviews for other time periods



1/25/2013 - TCF National Bank, Sioux Falls, SD
$10 M CMP Agencies: OCC Assets (9/30/12): $17.9B

On January 25, 2013, the OCC announced that it had issued a consent order for the assessment of a $10 million civil money penalty against TCF National Bank, with a home office in Sioux Falls, SD, and 436 total offices in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

The OCC had in July 2010 issued a consent C&D order (see below) for failure to establish and maintain an adequate BSA/AML program, citing SAR violations, and program violations.

Under the earlier Order, the bank had a consultant conduct a look-back to review activity specified in the Order from November 2008 through July 2010, which resulted in the bank's late-filing of 2,357 SARs covering transactions of about $70 million, involving structuring and other extraordinary customer transactions. In a November 2011 exam, the OCC identified 13 failures to properly file SARs on transactions possibly related to terrorist financing (the SARs had been filed, but were determined to be inadequate and "of poor quality." For example, the "terrorist financing" box on the SARs had not been checked (although the narrative made reference to possible terrorist financing), and in some cases, the narrative section was considered inadequate.



12/11/2012 - HSBC Holdings plc and affiliates
$1.9 B CMPs/Forfeiture, C&D Agencies: FinCEN, OCC, OFAC, FRB, Justice Assets (9/30/12): unknown

On December 11, 2012, a Department of the Treasury press release announced settlements totaling $875 million with HSBC Holdings plc and its affiliates, reached by FinCEN, the OCC and OFAC. Additional penalties in a combined federal, local and international government action bring the overall assessments against HSBC to more than $1.9 billion, for its conduct in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act and U.S. sanctions. The Treasury announcement was followed by releases by OFAC, the Federal Reserve Board the OCC, and the Justice Department.

Treasury's press release includes a detailed description of the shortcomings of the banks' BSA/AML compliance programs.

Treasury press release
OFAC press release
OFAC settlement agreement
Federal Reserve Board press release
FRB CMP Order against HSBC Holdings plc and HSBC North America Holdings, Inc.
FRB C&D Order against HSBC Holdings plc
OCC press release
OCC C&D Order against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
OCC CMP Order against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
Justice Department press release



11/16/2012 - First Bank of Delaware, Wilmington, DE
$15 M CMP, "Death Penalty" Agencies: FDIC, FinCEN, DOJ Assets (6/30/12): $222.5 M
Capital: $41.5 M

On 11/16/2012, the FDIC and FinCEN announced the assessment of concurrent CMPs of $15 million against the bank, for violations of the BSA and AML laws and regulations. The bank also settled civil charges on related activities brought by the Justice Department. All penalties will be satisfied by a single $15 million payment to Treasury.

The FDIC and FinCEN determined that the bank failed to implement an effective BSA/AML Compliance Program with internal controls reasonably designed to detect and report evidence of money laundering and other suspicious activity. Specifically, the bank failed to adequately oversee third-party payment processor relationships and related products and services in a manner commensurate with associated risks. The civil money penalty is the result of the bank's history of noncompliance with laws and regulations and its numerous violations of the BSA.

“To make money, First Bank of Delaware entered into risky lines of business and chose to disregard its Bank Secrecy Act responsibilities,” said FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery. “As a result of its failure to implement systems and controls to identify and report suspicious activities, as required by the BSA, financial predators were able to victimize consumers.”

One of the bank's services cited in the FinCEN CMP Order was a Remotely Created Check (RCC) service operated by five third party payment processors. The bank failed to adequately monitor and control excessive unauthorized returns of RCCs deposited through the service. The bank also had major ACH merchant clients, one of which ran almost $22 million in ACH transactions for a foreign-based MSB in the business of "facilitating banking transactions."

On November 16, 2012, Bryn Mawr Trust Company, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, purchased certain assets and assumed deposit liabilities from the First Bank of Delaware. The Delaware Office of State Bank Commissioner terminated First Bank of Delaware's charter and the FDIC terminated its deposit insurance.



11/9/2012 - Moneygram International, Inc., Dallas, TX
$100 M Forfeiture
Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Agencies: DOJ Assets unknown

On 11/9/2012, the Department of Justice announced that Moneygram International, Inc., agreed to forfeit $100 million and enter into a five-year deferred prosecution agreement in which it admits to criminally aiding and abetting wire fraud and failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program. According to court documents, MoneyGram was involved in mass marketing and consumer fraud phishing schemes, perpetrated by corrupt MoneyGram agents and others, that defrauded tens of thousands of victims in the United States.  MoneyGram also failed to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act.  The Justice Department will return the forfeited funds to the victims of the fraud scheme through its Victim Asset Recovery Program.  



4/4/2012 - Citibank, N.A., Sioux Falls, SD
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (12/31/11): $1,288 B

On 4/5/2012, the OCC issued a press release announcing that it issued on 4/4/12 a cease and desist order against Citibank, N.A. for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and underlying regulations. According to the OCC, the order requires the bank to take comprehensive corrective actions to improve its BSA compliance program.

The compliance program alledgedly had deficiencies with respect to internal controls, customer due diligence, the independent BSA and anti-money laundering audit function, monitoring of its remote deposit capture and international cash letter instrument processing in connection with foreign correspondent banking, and suspicious activity reporting related to that monitoring. These findings resulted in violations by the bank of statutory and regulatory requirements to maintain an adequate BSA compliance program, file suspicious activity reports, and conduct appropriate due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts.

As part of the Order, the bank is required to arrange for an independent look-back for suspicious activity covering areas (and presumably time-frames) to be designated by the bank's Examiner-in-Charge.



8/22/2011 - Ocean Bank, Miami, FL
$ 10.9 M CMP Agencies: FinCEN, FDIC, FL Office of Financial Regulation Assets (3/31/11): $3.6 B

On 8/22/11, FinCEN, the FDIC and the FL Office of Financial Regulation (OFR) issued a joint press release announcing Orders [FinCEN; FDIC] for the assessment of concurrent civil money penalties of $10.9 million against Ocean Bank, Miami, Florida, for violations of federal and state Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and anti-money (AML) laundering laws and regulations. Ocean Bank, without admitting or denying the allegations, consented to payment of the civil money penalties, which was satisfied by a single payment to the U.S. Government. [In March 2007, the FDIC issued Ocean Bank a C&D relating to the alleged violations. See below.

The CMP Order alleges violations of the BSA and implementing regulations (31 CFR Chapter X, 12 CFR § 326.8 and 12 CFR Part 353), violations of the 2007 C&D and violations of applicable Florida statutes and regulations. The Orders cite the filing of a criminal Information and a Deferred Prosecution Agreement by the U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of Florida.



4/21/2011 - Lower Sioux Indian Community, Morton, MN
$ 250 K CMP Agencies: FinCEN Assets Unknown

FinCEN announced that is issued an Order for Assessment of Civil Money Penalty (CMP) for $250,000 against the Lower Sioux Indian Community d/b/a Jackpot Junction Casino Hotel, Morton, MN, on April 20, 2011. The Jackpot Casino, with annual gaming revenues exceeding $1 million, is subject to the Bank Secrecy Act and implementing regulations. It is examined for compliance by the IRS. FinCEN found that the Casino, during the period from 4/1/2006 through 5/28/2009, “committed extensive violations of the anti-money laundering program and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations,” and “suffered from material deficiencies in multiple core elements of its anti-money laundering program, which also resulted in violations of the currency transaction reporting and suspicious activity reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.”



3/23/2011 - Pacific National Bank, Miami, FL
$ 7 M CMP Agencies: FinCEN; OCC Assets (12/31/10): $358 M

The OCC issued a press release on 3/24/11, announcing that it had issued a Consent Order for a $7 million Civil Money Penalty against Pacific National Bank, Miami, FL. The release also reported that FinCEN had ordered a concurrent $7 million penalty (a single $7 million payment will satisfy both penalty orders).

The OCC had issued an earlier Consent Order against the bank in 2005, directing that the bank findings that it had failed to establish and maintain procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor [its] compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and that the bank had violated the OCC's SAR requirements and BSA compliance program regulations. In an exam starting on March 25, 2009, the OCC determined that the bank continued to be in violation of the BSA and Treasury and OCC regulations. Similar violations were identified in a March 23, 2010 exam. In the exams, the OCC found that the bank failed to

  • develop and implement an effective risk assessment program;
  • ensure that sufficient and qualified Bank resources were available to effectively manage the BSA/anti-money laundering risk, comply with applicable laws and regulations, correct violations, and remediate other deficiencies addressed in the 2005 BSA Order in a timely manner;
  • implement adequate policies, practices, procedures and internal controls for conducting customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence;
  • implement effective policies, procedures, and internal controls to ensure effective monitoring, customer due diligence, and enhanced due diligence pertaining to the Bank's foreign correspondent bank accounts;
  • implement appropriate procedures for identifying, monitoring and reporting suspicious activity;
  • identify and report suspicious activity involving foreign correspondent bank accounts;
  • file suspicious activity reports and report ongoing suspicious activity in a timely manner;
  • ensure that adequate and timely independent audits were conducted and that full audit reports issued; and
  • identify and monitor suspicious activity in the bank's bill payment systems.

Among the factors cited as causing the bank's failure to comply are (i) failure to recognize the risk inherent in foreign correspondent bank accounts and to adequately monitor transactions in light of that risk; (ii) inadequate staffing of the BSA department; (iii) failure to have adequate policies and procedures governing the foreign correspondent bank accounts; and (iv) inadequate collection and analysis of customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence information.



3/8/2011 - Victor Kaganov, Tigard, OR
$ 25 K CMP Agencies: FinCEN; DOJ; FBI Assets Unknown

FinCEN issued a press release on 3/8/11, announcing that it had assessed a $25,000 CMP against Victor Kaganov of Tigard, OR, for “violating Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requirements for money transmitters. FinCEN determined that Kaganov violated BSA registration, anti-money laundering program, and suspicious activity reporting requirements while conducting an independent money transmitter business from his residence.” Kaganov is alleged to have “conducted more than 4,200 funds transfers in the United States, involving total dollars amounting to more than $172 million, to and from a number of locations in Europe and Asia” from 2002 through 2009. “In a typical transaction, funds were wired into a U.S. bank account controlled by Kaganov, and from there Kaganov instructed his bank to transmit the funds to a third party beneficiary. Kaganov repeatedly conducted business in violation of the BSA and outside the regulatory framework for money transmitters.”

Kaganov also pled guilty on March 1 to a single count of operating an inlicensed money transmitting business, for which he was charged in federal court on March 3, 2010 (see DOJ Release). He is scheduled for sentencing on April 19, 2011.



3/2/2011 - Omar Abukar Sufi and Mohamed Abukar Sufi, Wyoming, MI
$ 40 K CMP Agencies: IRS; FinCEN Assets Unknown

Omar Abukar Sufi and his brother, Mohamed Abukar Sufi, operated Halal Depot of Wyoming, Michigan, a money transmission business, as part of their grocery store operation. The Sufi brothers sent funds on behalf of their customers to persons in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, Ethiopia, Qatar, Europe and the United Arab Emirates. At no time did the Sufi brothers register with FinCEN as a money services business (MSB) as required by the BSA. According to the FinCEN press release, the money transmission business “facilitated the transfer of tens of thousands of dollars over the course of multiple years. The [Sufi] brothers accepted cash and other instruments, such as food stamp proceeds, and charged fees of 6-7 percent per transaction to facilitate these transfers. They recently pled guilty in United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan to federal criminal charges of food stamp fraud and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business, among other charges. The brothers were sentenced to five years in prison and required to pay restitution to the U.S. Department of Agriculture which funds the food stamp program.”



1/31/2011 - Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd., Los Angeles, CA
$ 350 K CMP Agencies: FDIC, CA Dept. of Fin'l Inst. Assets (12/31/10) - $1.3 B

Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd. is chartered as a U.S. branch of a foreign institution. It has one office, in Los Angeles, CA. On 1/31/11, the FDIC and the California Department of Financial Institutions (DFI) issued the bank a $350,000 CMP Order, half to be paid to the U.S. Treasury and half to the DFI.

The Order states that the agencies believe that from at least 200 through 2009, the bank lacked an adequate program to monitor, analyze, and report suspicious activity. In addition, the FDIC and the DFI have determined that the Bank had failed to comply with an August 27, 2008 Consent Order issued by the FDIC and the DFI.



2/11/2011 - Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, UT
$ 8 M CMP Agencies: OCC; FinCEN Assets (9/30/10) - $17 B
Zion's First National Bank is headquartered in Salt Lake City, UT, with 148 offices in UT and ID, and one foreign office. On 2/11/2011, the OCC and FinCEN each announced the issuance of concurrent consent orders for the assessment of $8 million civil money penalties. The two CMPs will be satisfied by a single payment of $8 million.

[OCC Order  FinCEN Order]

The OCC Consent Order focuses on activity of Zion's former foreign correspondent business, which was wound down in 2008. During 2006 and 2007, according to the OCC's findings, Zion's
  1. failed to adequately monitor over $5.4 billion of activity in 2006 and 2007 for a new product initiative, specifically remote deposit capture (“RDC”), offered to former foreign correspondent customers, including casas de cambio (CDCs)
  2. failed to adequately monitor wire activity of its former foreign correspondent customers, including $7.9 billion of wire activity with CDC customers in 2006 and 2007, before the Bank exited the line of business in early 2008
  3. had inadequate SAR processes for its former CDC and foreign correspondent customers and failed to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) on a timely basis with respect to those customers
  4. failed to comply with the business' policies and statutory requirements regarding customer due diligence (“CDD”) and enhanced due diligence (“EDD”) for its former foreign correspondent customers for a period of two years, from 2006 to early 2008
  5. therefore was in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) and 12 C.F.R. §21.11, and of 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) and 31 C.F.R. §103.176.

The following is excerpted from the FinCEN Order:

“Zions utilized RDC to process certain deposit items from its non-United States correspondent accounts. RDC, a deposit-transaction delivery system, allows a financial institution to receive digital information from deposit documents captured at remote locations such as financial institution branches, ATMs, domestic and foreign correspondents, or locations owned or controlled by commercial or retail customers of the financial institution. In substance, RDC is similar to traditional deposit-delivery systems at financial institutions. However, RDC enables customers of financial institutions to deposit items electronically from locations globally.

“RDC introduces additional risks beyond traditional deposit-delivery systems because it enables a bank's customers to scan a check or monetary instrument and then send the scanned or digitalized image to the financial institution without the need for face-to-face transactions. This change in the interaction process for executing such transactions raises several challenges, including but not limited to: (i) the difficulty of determining in what jurisdiction the equipment is being used and by whom; (ii) development of internal controls to ensure transaction data and check images are not altered; and (iii) implementation of monitoring by qualified personnel for potentially fraudulent, sequentially numbered or altered money orders or traveler's checks.”



7/20/10 - TCF National Bank, Sioux Falls, SD
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (6/30/10) - $18 B
TCF National Banks is headquartered in Sioux Falls, SD, with 445 offices located in 8 western and mid-western states. On 7/20/2010, the OCC issued a Consent Order directing the Directors and management of the bank to take a number of actions, including specific actions relating to the bank's Bank Secrecy Act compliance. In general terms, the bank was directed to review, updatge and implement a written, institution-wide, ongoing BSA Risk Assessment, to review and update its risk-based processes relating to customer due diligence, to revise and enhance and ensure Bank adherence to a written program of policies and procedures relating to BSA internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA and OFAC regulations, to provide for appropriate oversight of the bank's BSA independent testing function, to review and revise its written program for internal controls and processes to ensure compliance with SAR filing requirements, and to complete a "look-back" review of account and transaction activity for suspicious activity covering activity since 11/3/2008. Details of the BSA compliance related mandates in the Order can be found in Articles II through VII of the Order, beginning on page 3 .


5/19/10 - Security Bank, N.A., North Lauderdale, FL
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (6/30/10) - $148.2 M
Security Bank, National Association is a national bank headquartered in North Lauderdale, FL, with a total of six offices in three southeastern counties of that state. On 5/19/2010, the OCC issued a Consent Order directing the Directors and management of the bank to take a number of actions, including specific actions relating to the bank's Bank Secrecy Act compliance. In general terms, the bank was directed to address its identification and monitoring of transactions that pose greater than normal risk for compliance with the BSA and OFAC regulations, and to appoint a qualified and experienced BSA Officer ot oversee and manage the bank's BSA operations and compliance, with sufficient training, authority, and skills to perform assigned responsibilities. Details of the BSA compliance related mandates in the Order can be found in Articles VIII and IX of the Order, beginning on page 17 .


8/26/10 - Ozark Heritage Bank, N.A., Mountain View, AR
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (6/30/10) - $66.2 M
Ozark Heritage Bank National Association is a national bank with two branches in Arkansas. On 8/26/2010, the OCC issued a Consent Order directing the Directors and management of the bank to take a number of actions, including specific actions relating to the bank's Bank Secrecy Act compliance. In general terms, the bank was directed to address its identification and monitoring of transactions that pose greater than normal risk for compliance with the BSA and OFAC regulations, and to produce written procedures to assist personnel in understanding the requirements of the BSA to ensure compliance. Details of the BSA compliance related mandates in the Order can be found in Articles XVI and XVII, beginning on page 29 of the Order.


09/01/10 - First National Community Bank, Dunmore, PA
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (6/30/10) - $1.3 B
First National Community Bank is headquartered in Dunmore, PA, and has 23 offices, all in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On 9/1/2010, The OCC announced the issuance of a Consent Order in which the Bank was directed to take various actions, including:
  • To "develop, implement, and thereafter ensure Bank adherence to a written program of policies and procedures to provide for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), as amended (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.), the regulations promulgated thereunder at 31 C.F.R. Part 103, as amended, and 12 C.F.R. Part 21, Subparts B and C, and the rules and regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) (collectively referred to as the “Bank Secrecy Act” or “BSA”) and for the appropriate identification and monitoring of transactions that pose greater than normal risk for compliance with the BSA.
  • To "develop, implement, and thereafter ensure Bank adherence to account-opening procedures for all accounts by requiring:
    • identification of all account owners and beneficial owners in compliance with 31 C.F.R. § 103.121 and the Interagency Statement on Beneficial Ownership Information (OCC 2010-11);
    • identification of the officers, directors, major shareholders or partners, as applicable, of business accounts;
    • documentation of the following information for all deposit account customers:
      • any relevant financial information concerning the customer;
      • the type of business conducted by the customer;
      • the customer's source of income or wealth; and
      • any other due diligence required by this Order, the BSA Officer or the Bank.
  • To "develop, implement, and thereafter ensure Bank maintenance of an integrated, accurate system for all Bank areas to produce periodic reports designed to identify unusual or suspicious activity, including patterns of activity, to monitor and evaluate unusual or suspicious activity, and to maintain accurate information needed to produce these reports."
  • To "develop, implement, and thereafter ensure Bank adherence to a written program of policies and procedures to provide for the Bank's monitoring of suspicious cash, monetary instruments, wire transfers, and other activities for all types of transactions, accounts, customers, products, and services."
  • To "develop, implement, and thereafter ensure Bank adherence to comprehensive procedures to identify and report to appropriate management personnel:
    • frequent or large volume cash deposits or wire transfers or book entry transfers to or from offshore or domestic entities or individuals;
    • wire transfers or book entry transfers that are deposited into several accounts;
    • receipt and disbursement of wire transfers or book entry transfers without an apparent bona fide business reason;
    • receipt and disbursement of wire transfers or book entry transfers that are suspicious or when they are inconsistent with the customer due diligence information and the customer's business; and
    • receipt and disbursement of currency or monetary instruments when they are inconsistent with the customer due diligence information and the customer's business."
  • To "ensure that the BSA audit function is supported by an adequately staffed department or outside firm, with respect to expertise, experience and number of the individuals employed."
There were also requirements for the establishment of an independent audit of BSA/AML compliance and for the assessment of the abilities of and supporting staff for the BSA Officer.


06/21/10 - Intercredit Bank, NA, Miami, FL
$200K CMP Agencies: OCC Assets (6/30/10) - $267.3 M
Intercredit Bank, National Association, is a national bank established in 1984 with four offices in Miami and one in Coral Gables, all within Miami-Dade County, Florida. On June 21, 2010, the OCC announced its issuance of a Consent Order for a Civil Money Penalty of $200,000.

In the Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of the Order, the OCC stated that it was in response to Intercredit's "failure to maintain a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.21, and for its failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 all of which occurred at the Bank during the years 2006-2007." The order noted that the Bank represented that it is taking steps to correct the failures.

On 9/9/08, the OCC issued a related C&D Order to the bank. Click HERE for further information.


10/07/10 - HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. & HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
C&D Agencies: Fed, OCC Assets of parent unknown
On October 7, 2010, The Federal Reserve Board announced that it had, on October 4, issued a consent C&D Order between HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. (HNAH), New York, New York, a registered bank holding company, and the Federal Reserve Board. The order requires HNAH to take corrective action to improve its firmwide compliance risk-management program, including its anti-money laundering compliance risk management. Concurrent with the Federal Reserve Board's announcement of its enforcement action, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency announced its 10/6/10 issuance of a Cease and Desist Order against HSBC Bank USA, N.A., McLean, Virginia (HBUS, a subsidiary of HNAH), for violating the Bank Secrecy Act and its underlying regulations.

HNAH also owns and controls HSBC Trust Company, NA, Wilmington, DE; HSBC Bank Nevada, NA, Las Vegas, NV; HSBC Private Bank International, Miami, FL (and Edge corporation) and multiple nonbank subsidiaries. HNAH is a subsidiary of HSBC Holdings plc, London, England.

HSBC was directed to use its financial and managerial resources as a source of strength to its bank subsidiaries, and in particular HBUS to ensure that it complies with the OCC Consent Order regarding HBUS's BSA/AML program. It was also directed to "retain an independent consultant acceptable to the [Chicago Federal] Reserve Bank to complete a review of the effectiveness of the firmwide BSA/AML compliance program adopted by HNAH (the “BSA/AML Review”), and to prepare a written report of findings and recommendations (the “BSA/AML Report”)." In another section of the Order, HNAH was directed to "submit to the [Chicago Federal] Reserve Bank an acceptable written program designed to reasonably ensure the identification and timely, accurate, and complete reporting by HNAH and its subsidiaries of all known or suspected violations of law or suspicious transactions to law enforcement and supervisory authorities, as required by applicable suspicious activity reporting laws and regulations."

The OCC Order states that the agency found deficiencies in HBUS's BSA/AML compliance program, in particular deficiencies in internal controls for customer due diligence, procedures for monitoring suspicious activity, and independent testing. The Order also cited aggravating factors "such as highly suspicious activity creating a significant potential for unreported money laundering or terrorist financing." Specific cited deficiencies included special handling of wire transfers of customers domiciled in countries risk-rated as "standard" or "medium," resulting in limited and ineffective BSA/AML monitoring of 2/3 of the bank's wire activity; failure from 2006 to 2009 to monitor bulk cash transactions with foreign affiliates; failure to perform customer due diligence or enhanced due diligence for its foreign affiliates, inhibiting its assessment of customer risk and the identification of suspicious activity in accounts of those affiliates; failure to address a backlog of suspicious activity alerts (due to inadequate staffing), which caused the bank to file many late SARs; and failure to appropriately designate customers as "high-risk" for BSA/AML monitoring, even when a customer's association with PEPs could harm the bank's reputation.


08/26/10 - Pinnacle Capital Markets, LLC
$50 K Forfeiture Agencies: FinCEN, SEC Assets Unknown
On August 26, 2010, Pinnacle Capital Markets, LLC, a North Carolina limited liability company and securities broker-dealer that focuses its businesses activities on providing foreign individuals and institutions access to US securities markets, consented to the assessment by FinCEN of a $50,000 CMP.

"FinCEN ... determined that Pinnacle violated the anti-money laundering (“AML”) program and suspicious activity reporting requirements of the BSA and its implementing regulations. The Firm's business model encompassed heightened AML risk due to concentrated exposure to high risk foreign jurisdictions. The violations Pinnacle engaged in were systemic: (i) lack of adequate internal controls combined with deficient training and independent testing, resulting in an ineffective AML compliance program not tailored to the risks of Pinnacle's business, (ii) failure to verify the identity of customers by not obtaining required customer identification program (“CIP”) information for accountholders, and (iii) deficiencies in the Firm's procedures and monitoring for suspicious transactions leading to failure to file suspicious activity reports in accordance with the BSA. This civil money penalty assessment is the result of AML program deficiencies, CIP failures, and BSA reporting violations that occurred, in large part, between October 2002 and September 2009."

The $50,000 CMP assessment is to be paid in two installments, and includes a $25,000 concurrent assessment by the SEC.


05/10/10 - Former ABN AMRO Bank N.V.
$500 M Forfeiture Agencies: DOJ Assets Unknown
On May 10, 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that the former ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. (now the Royal Bank of Scotland, N.V.) agreed to forfeit $500 million to the U.S. Treasury in connection with a criminal information filing in U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The bank was charged with a single count of violating the Bank Secrecy Act and one count of conspriing to defraud the U.S. and violated the International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). The IEEPA and TWEA are two of several laws underlying the sanctions administered by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The forfeiture was part of a deferred prosecution agreement, also filed on 5/10/2010.

According to the criminal information filing, the bank stripped information from funds transfer instructions and other transactions to disguise involvement of OFAC-sanctioned parties or to facilitate OFAC-prohibited transactions, and deliberately ignored its [OFAC and BSA] compliance obligations.

DOJ has recommended dismissal of the criminal information filing after one year, based on the bank's remedial actions since 2005, previous penalties and consent agreements [see information on a 2005 penalty, BELOW].


04/22/10 - Eurobank, San Juan, PR (now part of Oriental Bank & Trust)
$25 K CMP Agencies: FinCEN, FDIC Assets $2.56 B (12/31/09)
On April 22, 2010, FinCEN announced that Eurobank, a commercial bank with 23 branches in Puerto Rico, entered into a Consent to the Assessment of Civil Money Penalty with the agency. [Eurobank was merged 4/30/2010 with government assistance and now operates as part of Oriental Bank and Trust, San Juan.] The $25,000 penalty, according to the order, is based "on the seriousness of the violations at issue in this matter, and the limited financial resources available to Eurobank," and is "concurrent with a $25,000 civil money penalty assessed by the FDIC." The bank was subject to a 2007 C&D issued by the FDIC relating to inadequacies in the bank's BSA/AML compliance program. According to the FinCEN April 22, 2010, order, "Eurobank violated the requirement to establish and implement an adequate anti-money laundering program. Breakdowns in the Bank's anti-money laundering program caused the Bank to fail to effectively identify and report transactions that exhibited indicia of money laundering or other suspicious activity, relative to the types of products and services offered by the Bank, the volume of its business, and the nature of its customers. The civil money penalty by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is the result of deficiencies and transactions that occurred, in large part, at the Bank between April 2005 and December 2008." The order goes on to say that the bank failed to adequately implement any of the "Four Pillars" of an anti-money laundering program "that, at a minimum: (1) provides for a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance, (2) provides for independent testing for compliance conducted by bank personnel or by an outside party, (3) designates an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance, and (4) provides training for appropriate personnel."


03/29/10 - Pamrapo Savings Bank, SLA, Bayonne, NJ
$5 M Forfeiture/CMP $1 M CMP Agencies: OTS, DOJ, FinCEN (OTS links no longer available
Updated 6/3/2010
Assets $559 M (12/31/09)
On 6/3/2010, FinCEN announced that it had imposed a $1 million CMP on Pamrapo Savings Bank, SLA, in addition to the penalties imposed earlier by ATS and DOJ. To review the FinCEN assessment document, which expands on the information below concerning the bank's BSA/AML problems, click HERE.

On 3/29/2010, Pamrapo Savings Bank, SLA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Pamrapo Bancorp Inc. of Bayonne, NJ, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to violate the Bank Secrecy Act and agreed to forefeit $5 million to the U.S. Treasury. Concurrently, the OTS assessed a civil money penalty of $5 million (to be satisfied by the asset forfeiture to Treasury). The OTS order summarizes the Bank's offenses as violations of --
  • 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (h), 31 C.F.R. § 103.120(b), and 12 C.F.R. § 563.177 (requiring an effective AML program);
  • 12 C.F.R. § 563.180(d) and 31 C.F.R. § 103.18 (requiring the timely filing of accurate Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)); and
  • 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (requiring the filing of Currency Transaction Reports.
According to the DOJ Press Release, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, said, "Pamrapo Savings Bank's repeated and blatant violation of the Bank Secrecy Act shielded criminals and their activities from detection and prosecution by law enforcement. This case should send a strong message to banks that we will vigorously investigate and prosecute financial institutions that provide safe harbor to criminals."

The Press Release also states, "According to the criminal information filed today in U.S. District Court in Trenton, N.J., Pamrapo Savings Bank conspired with others to conceal its customers' illegal or suspicious activities by failing to file currency transaction reports (CTRs) and suspicious activity reports (SARs) and by willfully failing to maintain adequate anti-money laundering programs. Pamrapo Savings Bank admitted that it willfully violated the Bank Secrecy Act to avoid the expenses associated with compliance, despite federal and state banking regulators telling Pamrapo Savings Bank as early as 2004 that its Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering programs contained serious and systemic deficiencies in critical areas required under the law.

"Specifically, Pamrapo Savings Bank admitted during its guilty plea that it unlawfully failed to file CTRs and SARs related to approximately $35 million in illegal and suspicious financial transactions, including more than $5 million in structured currency transactions. The bank acknowledged that its willful failure to maintain adequate Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering programs resulted in numerous and repeated violations of the law.

"In one specific example outlined in court documents, from approximately March 2005 to September 2006, a co-conspirator cashed approximately 586 checks worth a total of $3.2 million, payable to "cash" at multiple branches of Pamrapo Savings Bank. Each check was under $10,000, thus structured to evade the bank's obligation to file CTRs. Ultimately, according to the court documents, Pamrapo Savings Bank willfully failed to file a SAR related to these known and repeated violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.

"In addition, Pamrapo Savings Bank admitted that it made false and misleading statements to bank regulators, including OTS, to prevent regulatory oversight and enforcement of its deficient Bank Secrecy Act compliance programs."


03/12/10 - Wachovia Bank, N.A., Charlotte, NC
$110M Forfeiture/CMP; $50M CMP; C&D Agencies: FinCEN, DOJ, OCC Assets $510 B (12/31/09)
On 3/12/2010, The OCC, FinCEN and DOJ announced that Wachovia Bank, N.A., had agreed to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with a forfeiture of $110 million with DOJ, a civil money penalty of $50 million and a C&D with the OCC, and a civil money penalty of $110 million with FinCEN. FinCEN agreed this its CMP would be satisfied by the payment of the DOJ forfeiture. The OCC's Consent Order summarizes the alleged failures in Wachovia's BSA/AML program, stating that the bank
  1. failed to implement adequate policies, procedures, or monitoring controls governing the repatriaation of nearly $14 billion of USD bulk cash for high risk casa de cambrio ("CDC") and other foreign correspondent customers (over $10 billion coming from Mexico into the U.S.);
  2. failed to conduct monitoring of high volumes of monetary instruments flowing through the CDCs and other foreign correspondent accounts in the form of Remote Deposit Capture ("RDC") products, consisting of nearly six million checks worth approximately $41 billion;
  3. failed to appropriately monitor traveler's checks in a manner that was consistent with the Bank's policy limits over sequentially number traveler's checks for high risk CDC customers;
  4. failed to appropriately institute risk-based monitoring of the Bank's foreign correspondent customers, primarily as a result oif placing too much emphasis on staffing considerations when setting alert parameters;
  5. failed to file timely SARs involving suspicious transactions conducted through certain foreign correspondent accounts at the Bank;
  6. after conducting a voluntary lookback, the Bank filed over 4,300 SARs involving suspicious transactions conducted through the Bank by CDCs and high risk foreign correspondent customers. A significant number of these SARs were not timely filed; and
  7. failed to adequately report cash structuring activity from review of alerts generated in the Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit.
DOJ News Release
OCC Consent Cease and Desist Order
OCC Consent Order for Civil Money Penalty
FinCEN Assessment of Civil Money Penalty


10/26/09 - Family Bank and Trust Co., Palos Hills, IL
Forfeiture Agencies: Justice Department Assets $78 M (6/30/09)
Family Bank and Trust Company (Family), an FDIC-insured non-member bank located in Palos Hills, Illinois, entered into a plea-bargain agreement announced on 10/26/09 by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. The bank agreed to plead guilty to federal criminal charges that it conspired with its former CEO and others to fail to file multiple CTRs involving deposits totaling more than $800,000. In its plea agreement, the bank agreed with the government to ask a judge to impose probation and a forfeiture of $800,000.

Family was closely held by its former president, Marvin Siensa, now deceased. The charges allege that Siensa and others caused the bank to fail to file CTRs on multiple cash deposits, and to use nominee accounts to disguise the nature of the deposits, which were largely the proceeds of illegal activity, allegedly international trafficking in pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine.


8/5/09 - First Standard Bank, Los Angeles, CA
C&D Agencies: FDIC & CA Dept of Financial Institutions Assets $139 M (6/30/09)
First Standard Bank is an FDIC-insured non-member bank with one office in Los Angeles, California. It was issued a Cease and Desist Order by the FDIC and the California Department of Financial Institutions on August 5, 2009. The Bank was ordered to stop, among other things
  • operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program;
  • operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) procedures to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activities;
  • operating in violation of section 103.100(b)(2)(i) of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b)(2)(i), regarding the failure to conduct section 314(a) information sharing and search requests within the prescribed time frames;
  • operating in violation of section 103.21 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.21, regarding procedures to establish minimum identification verification requirements;
  • operating in violation of section 103.22 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22, regarding Currency Transaction Report (“CTR”) procedures to report large dollar currency transactions;
  • operating in violation of section 103.27 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.27, regarding the failure to file Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”) in a timely fashion;
  • operating in violation of section 103.29 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.29, regarding the financial recordkeeping requirements; and
  • operating in violation of section 103.63 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.63, regarding inadequate procedures to accurately detect structured transactions.
One of the items listed in the Order to Cease and Desist is a statement by regulators that "Within 90 days of the effective date of this Order, the Bank shall implement all BSA/Anti-Money Laundering-related modules contained within its existing or new software system, customize the system parameters to meet the Bank's needs, test the software, revise related policies and procedures, and provide the comprehensive employee training needed to implement a fully functioning, automated system. The program shall, at a minimum, analyze cash transactions over an established threshold based on the Bank's risk-assessment, wire transfers, electronic funds transfers, and monetary instrument purchases and deposits. The program shall be a centralized review function and provide for full documentation of decisions for all items flagged as potentially suspicious."


8/4/09 - Heritage Bank of North Florida, Orange Park, FL
C&D Agencies: FDIC & Florida Office of Financial Regulation Assets $194 M (6/30/09)
Heritage Bank of North Florida is an FDIC-insured non-member bank with two offices in Florida. It was issued a Cease and Desist Order by the FDIC and the Florida Office of Financial Regulation on August 4, 2009. The Bank was ordered to stop, among other things, "operating with an ineffective training program for appropriate Bank personnel to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 of the United States Code, and its implementing rules issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103; the FDIC's BSA compliance regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, and the Florida Control of Money Laundering in Financial Institutions Act, Section 655.50, Florida Statutes (collectively, “BSA Rules”)."

The Bank was ordered to "develop a comprehensive BSA training program that shall have a general component for all directors and staff and specific components that are tailored to the needs of specific positions, departments, and personnel" and further, that the "training program shall provide for initial and periodic refresher training. The training program shall require documentation of attendance at training with full explanations of absences with notation of when absentees will be trained."


4/2/09 - Rocky Mountain Bank & Trust Florence, Florence, CO
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets $200.6 M (6/30/09)
Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust Florence, an FDIC-insured non-member bank located in Florence, CO, was issued a Cease and Desist Order by the FDIC on April 2, 2009. The Bank was ordered to stop, among other things, operating the Bank in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 531 1 et seq.) (the Bank Secrecy Act) ("BSA"), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U. S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) ("Financial Recordkeeping"), and Part 326 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326; and further operating with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA and its implementing regulations, including, but not limited to, a Customer Identification Program (“CIP”).

The bank was ordered to perform a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability of its banking operations to attempts to launder money, finance terrorism, or conduct other criminal activities (“BSA risk assessment”); review and update its BSA risk assessment at least annually; report the BSA risk assessment and subsequent updated to its board of directors, and cause the reviews to be documented in board meeting minutes; review and update its BSA risk assessment at least annually; and complete and implement any and all enhancements to its system of internal controls necessary to ensure full compliance with the BSA taking into consideration its size and risk profile.


4/20/09 - Doha Bank New York Branch, New York, NY
C&D Agencies: FinCEN and OCC Assets unknown
The New York Branch of Doha Bank, headquartered in Doha, Qatar, was assessed civil money penalties of $5 million by both the OCC and FinCEN, for past violations of the BSA. The two $5 million assessments will be satisfied by a single $5 million payment to the U.S. Treasury.

This action was preceded by an OCC C&D order in September 2006, in which Doha was ordered to complete a look-back of wire transfers, demand drafts and pouch items covering the period from 5/1/04 through 1/16/07. That review was completed in January 2008.

According to a press release from FinCEN and the OCC, "the OCC based its assessment of a $5 million civil money penalty, and the issuance of the C&D Order, on the Branch's failure to maintain a compliance program reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the BSA, and other related BSA compliance violations. Specifically, the Branch did not adequately identify, research, report, and monitor suspicious activities occurring through the Branch's funds transfers, pouch activity, demand draft services, and correspondent relationships, and did not adequately audit and independently test such activities. The Branch also failed to conduct sufficient due diligence on its foreign correspondents. The look-back mandated by the C&D Order confirmed the BSA program deficiencies cited in the C&D Order."

FinCEN's reasons for assessing its penalty were essentially identical. More telling was FinCEN Director Fries' comment: "Despite the current economic and resource challenges that many banks may face, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) compliance efforts must not be diminished. Timely, complete, and accurate Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are critical tools available to law enforcement as a means to deter and detect criminal activity. Used in conjunction with additional financial intelligence, SARs help law enforcement to ferret out criminal elements and combat fraud that threatens our financial system. As such, failure to follow BSA rules deprives law enforcement of valuable information in the investigation and prosecution of crime. FinCEN continues to collaboratively ensure that all financial institutions follow BSA rules which in turn serve to protect our financial system."

Press release from FinCEN/OCC
OCC Consent Order


2/12/09 - Upstate National Bank, Lisbon, NY
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets $96.5M (12/31/08)
Upstate National Bank is federally-chartered by the OCC, with its main office in Lisbon, NY, and 4 other full service offices and one messenger office in that state. On 2/12/09, the OCC issued the bank an Amended Order to Cease and Desist (the original order was issued June 24, 2008) from:
  • "processing ACH transactions for merchants" and
  • "processing Remote Deposit Capture (“RDC”) transactions for money service businesses"
until such time as the Bank has developed and the Board has adopted and implemented, risk management systems, written policies and procedures, and a Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering program, in accordance with 12 C.F.R. § 21.21, that will result in due diligence on the Bank's customers, their lines of business, the parties to whom their customers are providing services through the Bank and those customers' lines of business, and the effective monitoring, detection, and reporting of suspicious activities in the processing of RDC transactions."

The bank's board was directed to, prior to the bank's involvement in any new products or services, "prepare a written analysis of said product or service. The analysis shall, at a minimum, include the following:
  1. an assessment of the risks and benefits of the product or service to the Bank;
  2. an explanation of how the product or service is consistent with the Bank's strategic plan;
  3. an evaluation of the adequacy of the Bank's organizational structure, staffing, MIS, internal controls and written policies and procedures to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks associated with the product or service; and
  4. a profitability analysis, including growth projections and interest rate risk."



2/24/09 - Bank of Westminster, Westminster, SC
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets $29.7M (12/31/08)
Bank of Westminster is a state-chartered non-member bank with one office, located in Westminster, SC. On 2/12/09, the FDIC issued the bank an Order to Cease and Desist from:
"(a) operating without effective Board of Directors (“Board”) oversight and executive management supervision to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law and regulations related to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 of the United States Code, and its implementing rules issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103; the regulations of the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”); the FDIC's BSA compliance regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (“Part 353”) (collectively, “BSA Rules”);
(b) operating in violation of law, regulations, and/or Statements of policy as identified on pages 12-16 of the Joint FDIC and South Carolina State Board of Financial Institutions Report of Examination of the Bank dated September 2, 2008 (“Report”);
(c) operating with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA Rules;
(d) operating without effective coordinating and monitoring procedures by a designated individual responsible for ensuring day-to-day compliance with the BSA Rules;
(e) operating with an ineffective training program for appropriate Bank personnel to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
(f) operating without an effective system of independent testing for compliance with the BSA Rules; and
(g) operating with an ineffective customer identification program (“CIP”). CIP is the collective reference to section 103.121 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.121."

The bank was ordered to:
  • Develop, adopt and implement a written plan for continued administration of a program reasonably designed to ensure and maintain compliance with the BSA Rules.
  • Review, enhance and implement a written customer CIP appropriete for the bank's size and type of business, addressing criticisms in its most recent report of examination.
  • Update the bank's overall risk assessment of its compliance with the BSA risks.
  • Establish and implement monitoring and reporting procedures for SARs and CTRs.
  • Contract with an independent auditor to conduct a forensic review of all high-risk accounts and transactions since 1/1/2008 to determine whether any CTRs or SARs need to be filed.
  • Revise its BSA, AML and OFAC policies, procedures and practices to provide for risk ratings of customers, monitoring of high-risk accounts (using software), and systems for account aggregation for the purposes of determineing when CTRs or SARs need to be filed, documentation standards for new accounts, and methods for enforcing those policies, procedures and practices (with consequences specified for noncompliance).
  • Set up a written CDD program, to include EDD for high risk customers.
  • Establish written standards for independent testing of BSA, AML and OFAC compliance.
  • Adopt and implement a comprehensive written audit program that includes periodic and thorough reviews of compliance with BSA rules.
  • Provide for BSA, AML and OFAC training of personnel commensure with their duties, assignments and responsibilities. Specifically listed in the order are directors, executive officers, department heads, supervisors, loan officers, loan operations staff, tellers, bookkeepers, couriers, proof operators, IT staff and write-transfer staff.
  • Analyze staffing needs for BSA Department.
  • Designate a qualified BSA officer with appropriate responsibility and authority.



2/17/09 - Directors of Sykesville Federal Savings Association, Sykesville, MD
$10.5K CMPs Agencies: OTS $96.7M (12/31/08) - Institution
NOTE: Links to OTS source documents are no longer available.

Robert F. Wilson is Chairman of the Board of Sykesville Federal Savings Association (Sykesville). On 2/17/2009, Wilson was ordered to pay a non-reimburseable Civil Money Penalty of $2,000. The OTS Order included findings that Wilson had engaged in multiple violations of a final Consent Order to Cease and Desist dated 4/12/2007 issued to Sykesville on 4/12/2007, and in violation of laws and regulations, including violations of the Bank Secrecy Act and related regulations, and failure to ensure that Sykesville filed timely and accurate Thrift Financial Reports. In addition, Sykesville's Director and former president was hit with a similar CMP in the amount of $1,500, and seven directors or former directors were ordered to pay $1,000 each. The total penalties to be paid by the nine individuals was $10,500.

The link above is to the CMP order issued to Wilson. Except for names, titles, and amounts, the other eight orders are identical.

The 2007 C&D order cited actions "causing, bringing about, participating in, counsleing or the aiding and abetting of violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act" and related BSA regulations, of OTS regulaitons governing SARs (among others). As part of the Order, Sykesville was directed to complete a comprehensive review of its written program for compliance with the BSA Laws and Regulations and SAR regulations; strengthen that program as needed; ensure compliance with its CIP policy; and conduct OFAC checks on all new customers along with a quarterly OFAC check on its entire customer base. Here is a link to a copy of the Order.

On October 3, 2008, OTS replaced the 2007 C&D with a new one. The same BSA violations were cited, along with a number of safety and soundness concerns. The association's board was directed to identify a new qualified president/CEO, and to make management and oversight of the association's compliance with the BSA laws and regulations and consumer and other compliance laws and regulations the only responsibilities of the association's BSA/Compliance officer. The association was also ordered to form a compliance committee and generally strengthen its compliance program. The order reiterated most of the 2007 order's requirements for enhancing the association's BSA/AML compliance program, adding specific detailed requirements.



2/12/09 - University Bank, Ann Arbor, MI
C&D Agencies: FDIC & MI Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation Assets $129.3M (12/31/08)
University Bank is a state-chartered non-member bank with one office, located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. On 2/12/09, the FDIC and the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation (OFIR) jointly issued the bank an Order to Cease and Desist from, among other practices:
A. Operating the Bank with a Bank board of directors (“Board”) which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the executive management of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule and regulations.
B. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls, including ensuring ongoing compliance with the BSA and information technology (“IT”) requirements.
C. Operating the Bank without an effective BSA/anti-money laundering program.
D. Operating in violation of section 326.8, of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. § 326.8, and the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping Regulations, 31 C.F.R Part 103.
E. Operating the Bank with management whose practices have resulted in numerous violations of laws and regulations and contraventions of policy.
F. Directly conducting any and all types of activities associated with or in any way using the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) messaging system, or any other similar system used to facilitate international trade.
G. Conducting any and all types of activities associated with shell banking organizations.

The bank was ordered to take affirmative corrective action to complete a management study, have and retain qualified management; develop, adopt and implement a revised written BSA compliance program (including each of several enumerated attributes); cease the use of CHIPS and SWIFT (it may continue to use ACH and other wire transfer services); refrain from entering new business lines or offer new products or services without first completing (among other requirements) a thorough BSA risk assessment conducted by a qualified independent third party consulatant; analyze and assess its BSA Department's staffing needs; form a director's BSA committee to oversee compliance with BSA regulations and the bank's BSA program policies and procedures; complete an effective and comprehensive independent test of compliance with the BSA and 31 CFR Part 103 (within 120 days and annually thereafter); and arrange for a third-party look-back review of deposit account and transaction activity covering all SWIFT activity from 3/1/2007 forward, and for all other transactions, from 1/1/2008, to 2/12/2009, to determine whether any suspicious activity or transactions or messages were properly identified and reported under SAR regulations. Specifically to be covered in the look-back review must include all SWIFT actvity, foreign correspondent accounts, shell bank organizations, cash intensive customers (business or not), MSB customers, customers with international wire transfers, NGOs and charitable organizations, all high-risk customers, any customer on whom the bank has ever filed a SAR, and any customer related to any of the foregoing types of customers.

In addition, the bank must develop, adopt and implement as written CDD program, to include EDD for high-risk customers; policies and procedures for identifying and verifying unexpected types and dollar volumes of customer cash or wire transfer activity; formulate a comprehensive written internal audit program with independent third party review addressing compliance with all audit requirements related to BSA (plus IT and risk management); develop, adopt and implement a revised written program for monitoring and reporting suspicious activity; develop, adopt and implement a revised, effective "written program to assure full compliance with all OFAC rules and regulations," designed to adequately monitor and screen transactions appropriately based on the level of risk associated with the transactions.



1/29/09 - First Vietnamese American Bank, Westminster, CA
C&D Agencies: FDIC & CA Dep't of Financial Institutions Assets $53M (12/31/08)
First Vietnamese American Bank (the Bank) is a state-chartered non-member bank founded in May, 2005. It has one office, in Westminster, CA. On 1/29/09, the FDIC and the California Department of Financial Institutions jointly issued the bank an Order to Cease and Desist from, among other practices, operating with management whose policies and practices are detrimental to the Bank and jeopardise the safety of its deposits; operating with a board of directors which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the active management of the Bank; operating in violation of Section 103.27 of Department of the Treasury regulations at 31 CFR Part 103 (Filing of Reports); operating in violation of 12 CFR Part 326 (Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance); and operating in violation of 12 CFR Part 353 (Suspicious Activity Reports).(

The bank was ordered to take the following actions, among others:
  • Develop, adopt and implement a written compliance program designed to ensure and maintain compliance by the Bank with the BSA and related rules and regulations (a detailed list of expectations for the program are included in the Order).
  • Develop, adopt and implement a written customer due diligence program (with a detailed list of features in the Order).
  • Revise, adopt and implement its BSA policy to include the requirements of the Order.



01/02/09 - E*Trade Clearing, LLC & E*Trade Securities, LLC
$1M Fine Agencies: FINRA Assets Unknown
FINRA announced on 1/2/09 that it has imposed a $1 million fine against E*Trade Securities, LLC and E*Trade Clearing, LLC, collectively, for failing to establish and implement anti-money laundering (AML) policies and procedures that could reasonably be expected to detect and cause the reporting of suspicious securities transactions.

"FINRA found that between Jan.1, 2003 and May 31, 2007, E*Trade did not have an adequate AML program based upon its business model. Because E*Trade did not have separate and distinct monitoring procedures for suspicious trading activity in the absence of money movement, its AML policies and procedures could not reasonably be expected to detect and cause the reporting of suspicious securities transactions. The firm relied on its analysts and other employees to manually monitor for and detect suspicious trading activity without providing them with sufficient automated tools. FINRA determined that this approach to suspicious activity detection was unreasonable given E*Trade's business model."

This penalty by the non-governmental regulator of securities firms is in addition to penalties imposed earlier by the SEC (see 7/30/2008 entry).


12/03/08 - West Suburban Bank, Lombard, IL
C%&D Agencies: FDIC; Illinois Division of Banking Assets (9/30/08): $1.85 B
West Suburban Bank is an Illinois-chartered, non-member bank, with 41 offices in the state of Illinois. On 12/3/08, the FDIC and Illinois Division of Banking issued the bank an Order directing that the bank cease and desist from the following unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation related to the BSA:
  A. Operating the Bank with a board of directors (“Board”) which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the executive management of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule and regulations related to the BSA.
  B. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA.
  C. Operating the Bank without adequate independent testing commensurate with the level of BSA risk.
  D. Operating in violation of section 326.8, of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. § 326.8, and the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping Regulations, 31 C.F.R Part 103.
  E. Operating the Bank with management whose practices have resulted in violations of law and regulation related to the BSA.

The Order directed that the bank conducted a Look-Back Review of deposit account and transaction activity for the time period beginning 4/17/2006 through 12/3/08, to determine whether suspicious activity involving any accounts of, or transactions through, the Bank were properly identified and reported in accordance with the applicable suspicious activity reporting requirements. It also directed that a review be made of all SARs filed in that period, and that the bank amend or resubmit any SAR that is incomplete or inaccurate. The bank must develop, adopt and implement a written CDD program that includes an EDD for customers presenting a heightened risk of illicit activity, including high-risk MSBs.


11/13/08 - Mountain Commerce Bank, Erwin, TN
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets 9/30/08: $345.1 M
Mountain Commerce Bank ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member headquartered in Erwin, TN, with 7 offices located in that state. On November 13, 2008, the FDIC issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  1. Operating in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) (Bank Secrecy Act) (“BSA”), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) (“Financial Recordkeeping”), the FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326 (“BSA Programs and Procedures”), and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353; and
  2. Operating with a board of directors that has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the management of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of laws or regulations.
  3. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Compliance Program;
  4. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  5. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/AML training program to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  6. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA officer to properly direct, administer, and oversee the BSA program; and
  7. Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program (“CDD”) to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules.
The bank was ordered to undertake a lengthy list of corrective actions (click on the bank's name above to read a copy of the Order for full details), including a "look back" review of account and transaction activity for the period beginning 1/1/2007 and ending 11/12/2008, to identify any suspicious accounts or transactions and file any required SARs in connection with them.



11/03/08 - Blue Ridge Savings Bank, Inc., Asheville, NC
C&D Agencies: FDIC, NC Commissioner of Banks Assets 9/30/08: $298.4 M
Blue Ridge Savings Bank, Inc. ("Bank") is a state-chartered FDIC Savings Bank headquartered in Asheville, NC, with 10 offices located in that state and one in SC. On November 3, 2008, the FDIC and the North Carolina Commissioner of Banks issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  1. Operating without effective Board oversight and executive management supervision to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of laws and/or regulations related to the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), subchapter II of Chapter 53 of Title 31 of the United States Code, and its implementing rules issued by the U.S. Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103; the regulations of the Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”); the FDIC's BSA compliance regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, and the FDIC's suspicious activity report regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (“Part 353”) (collectively, “BSA Rules”);
  2. Operating with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA Rules;
  3. Operating without effective coordinating and monitoring procedures by a designated individual responsible for ensuring day-to-day compliance with the BSA Rules; and
  4. Operating with an ineffective customer identification program (“CIP”). CIP is the collective reference to section 103.121 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.121.
The Bank was ordered, among other things, to "develop, adopt, and implement a written plan for continued administration of a program reasonably designed to ensure and maintain compliance with the BSA Rules and CIP ("Compliance Plan"); ... [and] ensure future compliance with the BSA Rules."



10/17/08 - Fort Davis State Bank, Fort Davis, TX
C&D Agencies: FDIC, Texas Department of Banking - Termination of C&D 11/30/2011 Assets 9/30/08: $58.7 M
Fort Davis State Bank ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member bank with three offices in Texas. On October 17, 2008, the FDIC and the Texas Department of Banking ("Department") issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  1. Operating the Bank in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) (the Bank Secrecy Act) (“BSA”), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U. S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) (“Financial Recordkeeping”), and the FDIC's BSA Rules and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326; and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (all the rules referred to in this paragraph are referred to hereinafter, collectively, as “BSA Rules”);
  2. Operating the Bank without adequate supervision and direction by the Bank's Board of Directors and senior management of the Bank to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of Federal and State laws or regulations and to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  3. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Compliance Policy;
  4. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  5. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/AML training program to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  6. Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program (“CDD”) to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  7. Operating the Bank without an effective system of independent testing to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  8. Operating the Bank without effective Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) policies and procedures;
  9. Operating the Bank without a qualified individual responsible for BSA compliance;
  10. Failing to file a SAR on transactions designed to evade BSA regulations:
  11. Failing to maintain a due diligence program for correspondent accounts at foreign financial institutions;
  12. Failing to take reasonable steps to prohibit banking services to foreign shell banks;
  13. Failing to maintain records of persons willing to accept service of process for foreign financial institutions; and
  14. Failing to furnish required information on Currency Transaction Reports (“CTR”).
The Bank was ordered, among other things, to conduct a "look back review" of account and transaction activity for the period beginning 1/1/2006 and ending when required SAR policies are implemented, to determine if any suspicious activity had not been properly identified and reported, with particular emphasis on foreign correspondent accounts.



10/24/08 - Eastern National Bank, Miami, FL
$200K CMP Agencies: OCC Assets 9/30/08: $479 M
Eastern National Bank has five offices in the State of Florida. On October 24, 2008, it entered into a consent order and agreed to the assessment of a Civil Money Penalty of $200,000 for "its failure to maintain a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq., in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.21, and for its failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.11."



10/16/08 - Sanderson State Bank, Sanderson, TX
C&D Agencies: FDIC, Texas Department of Banking
Note: This bank was closed by Texas Department of Banking 12/12/08
Assets 9/30/08: $38.2 M
Sanderson State Bank ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member bank with a single office in Texas. On October 16, 2008, the FDIC and the Texas Department of Banking ("Department") issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  1. Operating the Bank in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) (the Bank Secrecy Act) (“BSA”), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U. S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) (“Financial Recordkeeping”), the FDIC's BSA Rules and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326, and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (all the rules referred to in this paragraph are referred to hereinafter, collectively, as “BSA Rules”);
  2. Operating the Bank without adequate supervision and direction by the Bank's board of directors and senior management of the Bank to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of Federal and State laws or regulations particularly in regard to compliance with Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation O, BSA Rules, and state branch banking laws;
  3. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Compliance Program;
  4. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  5. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/AML training program to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  6. Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA officer to properly direct, administer, and oversee the BSA program; and
  7. Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program (“CDD”) to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules.
The Bank was ordered, among other things, to conduct a "look back review" of account and transaction activity for the period beginning 1/1/2006 and ending with the effective date of the Order, to determine if any suspicious activity had not been properly identified and reported, with particular emphasis on foreign correspondent accounts.



10/02/08 - The Bank of Harlan, Harlan, KY
C&D Agencies: FDIC, Kentucky Dep't of Financial Institutions Assets 9/30/08: $126.6 M
The Bank of Harlan ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member bank with three offices in Kentucky. On October 2, 2008, the FDIC and the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions ("KDFI") issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the requirements for designation of a qualified Bank Secrecy Act officer, as required by section 326.8(c)(3) of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8(c)(3).


10/27/08 - Polk County Bank, Johnston, IA
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets 9/30/08: $163 M
Polk County Bank ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member bank with three offices in Iowa. On October 27, 2008, the FDIC issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from certain unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  • Part 103 of the Treasury Department's Financial Record-keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 §§ 18-38; and
  • Part 326, Subpart B-Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 12 C.F.R Part 326 §326.8.
The Bank was ordered to take the following action with respect to its BSA and AML Program:
  • Within 60 days of the effective date of this ORDER, the board shall revise the Bank's Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) program to address deficiencies and violations set forth in the Report of Examination.
  • The Bank's revised BSA and AML compliance programs shall ensure the Bank's future compliance with the BSA and related rules and regulations, including Part 103 of the Treasury Department's Financial Record-keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 §§ 18-38; Part 326, Subpart B-Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 12 C.F.R Part 326 §326.8; and Part 353 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353. At a minimum, the revised and enhanced compliance programs shall include the following:
    • establishment and documentation of training on a regular and on-going basis for management and Institution personnel on all relevant aspects of laws, regulations, and Institution policies and procedures relating to the BSA and OFAC compliance programs, with a specific concentration on the currency and monetary instruments reporting requirements;
    • procedures for the Institution's customer identification program and account opening procedures;
    • procedures regarding the identification and reporting of cash transactions;
    • procedures for transactions involving non-customers, including, but not limited to, wire transfer services, traveler's check services, and foreign exchange services; and
    • independent annual testing for compliance with the BSA in accordance with the procedures described in section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8.


10/02/08 - Kenney Bank and Trust, Kenney, IL
C&D Agencies: FDIC, Illinois Division of Banking Assets 9/30/08: $59 M
Kenney Bank and Trust ("Bank") is a state-chartered non-member bank with one office in Illinois. On October 2, 2008, the FDIC and the Illinois Division of Banking ("Division") issued the Bank an Order to Cease and Desist from operating the bank in an unsafe or unsound manner and from violations of law, rule, or regulation, among them the following:
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA.
  • Operating the Bank without a qualified BSA Officer.
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective training program for appropriate Bank personnel to ensure compliance with the BSA.
  • Operating the Bank without an adequate independent test commensurate with the level of BSA risk.
  • Operating in violation of section 326.8, of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. § 326.8, and the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 103.
  • Operating the Bank without effective risk assessment policies and practices to assure compliance with Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) regulations and policies.
  • Operating the Bank with management whose practices have resulted in violations of law and regulation.
  • Operating with inadequate internal controls, policies, and operating systems with regard to Money Services Businesses (“MSBs”), as that term is defined at Section 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(uu).
The order suggests particular regulatory concern for the Bank's missing or inadequate guidelines regarding administration of its Remote Deposit Capture program, MSB account activity, and its Cash Vault program, and ongoing monitoring of such accounts for suspicious activity and filing of required reports resulting from monitoring. Also found lacking were the Bank's risk assessments for BSA and OFAC compliance, including those involving RDC and Cash Vault activities. The Bank was ordered to form a Directors' BSA Committee to oversee the Bank's compliance program, and to enhance its independent testing of BSA compliance.

The Bank was directed to arrange for a "look back review" by an independent and qualified auditor, of deposit account and transaction activity covering the three years beginning October 2005, looking for suspicious activity not previously identified and reported. The review must include activity of the Bank's MSB, Cash Vault, high risk RDC and cash intensive customers (business and personal), customers with international wire transfers, all customers identified as high risk, customers on whom SARs had previously been filed, and all customers related to any of the foregoing.

The Bank was also directed to establish and maintain a written Customer Due Diligence and Extended Due Diligence program, with specific requirements for review of high risk MSB customers. The Order includes a prohibition on opening any new accounts for current or new MSB customers without FDIC approval, and a requirement for specific detailed documentation on all current MSB customer accounts.



10/07/08 - Omni National Bank, Atlanta, GA
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets 6/30/08: $1.03 B
Omni National Bank is a federally-chartered bank headquartered in Atlanta, GA, with 10 additional branches in five states. On October 7, 2008, the OCC issued a Consent Order to Cease and Desist on Omni.

Article XVI of the Order calls for Omni to review, revise and strengthen its existing program to "ensure that it incorporates a comprehensive system of internal controls, independent testing, and audit to ensure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and anti-money laundering (“AML”) safeguards, is risk-based and addresses all lines of business, including domestic and international operations. The Order recites a standard laundry list of items that the program must include.


11/07/08 - Dresdner Bank AG, Frankfurt, Germany & Dresdner Bank AG, New York Branch
C&D Agencies: Fed & NY State Banking Department Assets 6/30/08: Unknown
Dresdner Bank AG is a foreign bank under the International Banking Act, with a New York City branch which provides significant correspondent banking services to Dresdner's non-U.S. branches and affiliates, and conducts U.S. dollar funds transfer clearing for corporate clients. On November 7, 2008, Dresdner Bank, its New York branch, the Fed and the NY State Banking Department mutually agreed to enter into a consent Cease and Desist Order.

The Order calls for a review of the effectiveness of the NY Branch's corporate governance, control infrastructure and business line accountability with respect to BSA/AML compliance, to enhance the bank's oversight of the NY Branch's compliance program and ensure adequate staffing for an effective control environment. The review is to cover the duties and responsibilities of each officer and staff member regarding BSA/AML compliance; a plan to train, recruit, hire or appoint any needed additional officers and staff. The Bank must also retain an independent consultant to conduct an independent review of the NY Branch's BSA/AML compliance program, such review to be completed within 60 days of retaining the consultant. The bank is ordered to submit a revised and updated compliance program within 60 days of receiving the independent review report.

Additionally, the Bank must submit an enhanced written plan for independent testing of compliance with BSA/AML requirements; a written plan and timetable for installation, testing and activation of a proposed new transaction monitoring system; written policies and procedures for monitoring customer accounts and transactions to manage legal and reputational risk and ensure compliance with regulatory requirements; a written customer due diligence program designed to identify and timely report known or suspected violations of law against or involving the NY Branch and suspicious transactions as required by SAR rules; a written plan to improve training of all appropriate personnel at the NY Branch, including customer contact personnel.


09/25/08 - First Asian Bank, Las Vegas, NV
C&D Agencies: FDIC, NV Financial Institutions Division Assets 6/30/08: $39 M
First Asian Bank is a state-chartered non-member bank with two offices in Las Vegas, NV. On 9/25/08, the bank received a Cease and Desist Order from the FDIC and the Nevada Financial Institutions Division.

Within 90 days of the date of the order, the Bank must "implement and improve its policies and procedures to ensure full compliance with Bank Secrecy Act / Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) regulations. The Bank's policies and procedures shall address, at a minimum, the customer identification program, customer due diligence procedures, suspicious activity reporting, BSA/AML risk assessment procedures, information sharing between law enforcement and the Bank, and training."


09/15/08 - Citizens Community Bank, Ridgewood, NJ
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets 6/30/08: $46 M
Citizens Community Bank is a state-chartered non-member bank with one office in Ridgewood, NJ. On 9/15/08, the bank received a Cease and Desist Order from the FDIC.

In the C&D, the bank was ordered to cease and desist from, among other things,
  • "Operating in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332, and implemented by rules and regulations issued by the United States Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, and the FDIC, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 (hereafter collectively “BSA”);
  • "Operating in violation of section 326.8(c)(3)of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8(c)(3) [which required the designation of an individual or individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance with the BSA requirements];
  • "Operating in violation of section 353.3(e) of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3(e) [retention of SAR file records];
  • "Operating in violation of section 353.3(f) of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3(f) [reporting of SARs to board of directors];
  • "Operating with inadequate management supervision and oversight by the Board to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of law and regulation, including violations of the BSA."


09/09/08 - Intercredit Bank, N.A., Miami, FL
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets 6/30/08: $373 M
Intercredit Bank, N.A., is a national bank headquartered in Miami, Florida, with six offices in that state. On 9/9/08, the bank executed a Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of a Consent Order from the Comptroller of the Currency.

The bank was given 120 days to develop, implement, and ensure its compliance to a written program of policies and procedures to provide for compliance with the BSA, and 12 CFR Part 21, Subparts B and C, and OFAC rules and regulations, and for ID and monitoring of transactions that pose greater than normal risk for compliance with those rules. The bank was directed to develop, implement and ensure compliance with a written program of policies and procedures to provide for "monitoring of suspicious cash, monetary instruments, wire transfers, and other activities for all types of transactions, accounts, customers, products, services and geographic areas," and a program for additional monitoring for "all types of transactions, accounts, customers, products, and geographic areas that pose greater than normal risk for compliance" with the BSA. Added improvements were ordered in the bank's account opening procedures, to include enhanced CIP procedures, and in the identification and reporting of suspicious activity. The bank was ordered to improve its BSA/AML training program, and to ensure appropriate training for all personnel, to identify and appoint a permanent, capable BSA Officer, and adopt, implement and ensure adherence to an independent audit program.


08/27/08 - Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd., Los Angeles, CA
C&D Agencies: FDIC & California Dept. of Financial Institutions Assets 6/30/08: $282 M
Mizrahi Tehahot Bank, Ltd., is a U.S. branch of a foreign institution, headquartered in Los Angeles. On 8/27/2008, the bank entered into a Stipulation and Consent to the Issuance of an Order to Cease and Desist with the FDIC and the California Department of Financial Institutions. The bank was ordered to cease and desist from (a) operating in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and anti-money laundering (“AML”) compliance program; (b) operating in violation of 12 C.F.R. Part 353 regarding Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) procedures to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activities; and (c) operating in violation of 31 C.F.R. § 103.176(a) regarding lack of due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts.

The bank was ordered to take all necessary steps to ensure future compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, including, but not limited to, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) requirements; to provide for a system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA; provide for independent testing of compliance with the BSA, all applicable rules and regulations related to the BSA, and the reporting of suspicious transactions required to be reported pursuant to 12 C.F.R. Part 353; provide that the Bank's BSA compliance program is managed by a qualified officer who has the required authority, responsibility, training, resources, and management reporting structure to ensure compliance with the Bank's program requirements and BSA-related regulations; provide and document training by competent staff and/or independent contractors of all of the Bank's affected personnel, including, without limitation, senior management, tellers, customer service representatives, lending officers, private and personal banking officers and all other customer contact personnel, in all aspects of regulatory and internal policies and procedures related to the BSA, with a specific concentration on accurate recordkeeping, form completion and the detection and reporting of known and/or suspected criminal activity; review and revise the Bank's written customer due diligence program; develop a program for reviewing the files of account holders at the Bank who have been accorded “W-8” tax exempt status, but who appear to hold such accounts for the benefit of third parties and/or do not qualify for “W-8” tax exempt status; and ensure that it adheres to its existing policy prohibiting acceptance of customers that are Non-Banking Financial Institutions (“NBFI”), which include Money Services Businesses (“MSBs”), or revise its written procedures to include guidelines as to what type of NBFI customers the Bank accepts and does not accept and have specific procedures for each.


08/21/08 - Chestatee State Bank, Dawsonville, GA
C&D Agencies: FDIC and GA Department of Banking and Finance Assets 6/30/08: $286 M
Chestatee State Bank is a state-chartered non-member bank. On August 21, 2008, the bank was issued and Order to Cease and Desist from operating in apparent violation of laws, regulations, and/or statement of policy detailed in the FDIC Report of Examination of October 29, 2007. Among those apparent violations were BSA compliance program deficiencies that were not further described in the C&D Order.


07/30/08 - E*Trade Clearing LLC and E*Trade Securities LLC, New York, NY
C&D & CMP $1 M Agencies: SEC Assets uknown
E*Trade Clearing LLC and E*Trade Securities LLC (E*Trade) are wholly owned subsidiaries of E*Trade Financial Corporation, a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York. They are broker-dealers registered with the SEC. On July 31, 2008, the SEC published an order imposing remedial sanctions, penalties and a cease-and-desist order under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Each of the LLCs was ordered to pay $500K to the U.S. Treasury within 30 days.

In the Findings portion of the Order, the SEC stated that from October 2003 until June 2005, E*Trade failed to follow its own CIP and SEC regulations requiring that broker-dealers adhere to Treasury's CIP regulations at 31 CFR 103.122 for broker-dealers. Specifically, E*Trade filed to verify the identities of secondary accountholders in newly opened joint accounts. The SEC found E*Trade's failure to be systemic, due to a lack of a cohesive organizational structure, the lack of adequate management oversight, and miscommunications between personnel in E*Trade business groups.

When using a third party vendor for vetting new customer information, E*Trade failed to forward the names of secondary accountholders to the process, in spite of its own policies to the contrary, and in spite of internal reports to internal compliance officers that the second names were not being vetted.

E*Trade was directed to engage an independent consultant to assess the adequacy of E*Trade's CIP policies and procedures and whether E*Trade is in substantial compliance with both its statutory obligations and the companies' own policies and procedures.


07/09/08 - T Bank, NA, Dallas, TX
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets $152M 3/31/08
T Bank, National Association, is a national bank headquartered in Dallas, TX, with two offices. On 7/9/08, the bank entered into a Consent Order with the OCC. The order requires that the bank develop, implement and ensure compliance to a written program of policies and procedures to provide for compliance with the BSA, 31 CFR Part 103, 12 CFR Part 21, and OFAC rules and regulations, and for identification and monitoring of transactions posing a greater than normal risk for BSA non-compliance. The bank was also directed to put into place policies and procedures for monitoring suspicious cash, monetary instrument, wire transfer and other activities, and to enhance its account-opening procedures with regard to a Customer Identification Program in conformity with 31 CFR §103.121, and a customer due diligence program. The bank was ordered to develop and maintain an accurate system for all bank areas to produce periodic reports designed to identify unusual or suspicious activity, and to identify and periodically review high risk accounts.

The bank was also ordered to enhance its BSA independent audit.


06/04/08 - Eastern National Bank, Miami, FL
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets (3/31/08): $476 M
Eastern National Bank is a federally-chartered bank located in Miami, Florida, with five offices in that state. On June 4, 2008, Eastern National agreed to the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order, in which Order the OCC directed that the board of directors of Eastern National:
  1. appoint a Compliance Committee of at least three of its directors, no more than one of whom may be an insider or family member of an insider.
  2. develop, implement and ensure bank adherence to a written program of policies and procedures for
    • compliance with the BSA and regulations issued thereunder
    • monitoring of suspicious cash, monetary instruments, wire transfers and other activities for all types of transactions, accounts, customers, products, services and geographic areas
  3. develop, implement, and ensure bank adherence to expanded account-opening procedures for all accounts that pose greater than normal risk for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, and obtain the information required by these procedures before renewing or modifying an existing customer's account
  4. develop, implement and ensure bank adherence to a policy determining when the bank will not open, block use of or close an account (and file appropriate SARs) if the information required by bank policy for opening or maintaining account is not supplied, if the bank doesn't have a reasonable belief that it knows its customer's true identity, or the bank determines that continuing the relationship would be detrimental to the bank's reputation
  5. develop, implement and maintain an integrated system for all bank areas to identify unusual or suspicious activity
  6. ensure that the bank's BSA officer periodically reviews (at least annually) all account information for high risk accounts (and related accounts) to determine whether account activity is consistent with the customer's business and the stated purpose of the account
  7. ensure that the bank has processes, personnel and control systems to implement and adhere to the program for compliance.



4/30/08 - Sun Security Bank, Ellington, MO
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets (12/31/07): $440 M (est.)
Sun Security Bank is an insured state-chartered non-member bank with 29 offices in Missouri. On April 30, 2008, Sun Security was issued a C&D order by the FDIC. The bank was ordered to cease and desist from several practices, including violating laws and regulations. Among the laws and regulations listed were "the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) ('Bank Secrecy Act'), the rules and regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) ('Financial Recordkeeping'), and the requirements of 12 C.F.R. Part 353 ('Suspicious Activity Reports')," described more fully in an FDIC October 29, 2007, Report of Examination.


4/22/08 - United Bank for Africa, PLC, New York, NY
CMP $15 M Agencies: FinCEN & OCC Assets (12/31/07): $441 M (est.)
On April 22, 2008, the OCC and FinCEN issued orders for concurrent $15 million Civil Money Penalties (to be satisfied by a single $15 million payment) in connection with the OCC's February 29, 2008, C&D order (see below). In the joint press release announcing the orders, FinCEN Director James J. Freis, Jr., said, "A financial institution that recklessly disregards its obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act and continues to operate without an effective anti-money laundering program, despite repeated warnings and a business focus on areas of recognized high risk, should expect to be penalized. The severity of this joint enforcement action is reflective of just such conduct. This is not a case of interpretation of technical issues or about minor lapses in compliance." OCC CMP Order; FinCEN CMP Order


4/14/2008 - El Noa Noa Corporation, Tampa, FL
$12,000 CMP Agencies: FinCEN Assets: Unknown
El Noa Noa Corporation is a money services business that has operated in Tampa, Florida (central Florida has been designated as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area - HIDTA) since 1998. EI Noa Noa provides check cashing, wire transfer and money order services to its customers. The Internal Revenue Service, Small Business/Self-Employed Division examines EI Noa Noa for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. On April 14, 2008, FinCEN announced that El Noa Noa had consented to the assessment of a $12,000 Civil Money Penalty, without admitting or denying the following FinCEN determinations:
  • Failure to establish and implement an anti-money laundering program with internal controls and other measures reasonably designed to prevent the money services business from being used to facilitate money laundering
  • Multiple failures to timely file currency transaction reports, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations
  • Despite actual knowledge of the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, EI Noa Noa continued to operate for an extended period of time without an effective anti-money laundering program. As of February 2005, EI Noa Noa still had not established and implemented a written anti-money laundering program.
  • EI Noa Noa failed to file a total of 66 currency transaction reports, in the aggregate amount of $1,025,948, from January 1,2004 through May 31,2005. EI Noa Noa failed to file 61 currency transaction reports on single check cashing transactions in excess of $10,000, in the amount of $963,438, and five currency transaction reports on multiple check cashing transactions in the amount of $62,510.


3/10/2008 - Independence Bank, Newport Beach, CA
C&D Agencies: FDIC, CA Dep't of Fin'l Inst. (CDFI) Assets (12/31/07): $383 M
Independence Bank, Newport Beach, CA, is an FDIC-insured state-chartered non-member bank established in 2004 with 3 offices in the state of California. On March 14, 2008, the FDIC and the CDFI issued a C&D order directing that the bank stop (among other things):
  • operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program; and
  • operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) procedures to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activities.



3/10/2008 - First Regional Bank, Century City, CA
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets (12/31/07): $2.17 B
First Regional Bank, Century City (Los Angeles), CA, is an FDIC-insured state-chartered non-member bank with 8 offices in the state of California. On March 10, 2008, the FDIC issued a C&D order directing that the bank stop (among other things):
  • operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program with respect to Individual Retirement Accounts administered by third parties;
  • operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) procedures to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activities with respect to Individual Retirement Accounts administered by third parties;
  • operating without adequate customer due diligence with respect to Individual Retirement Accounts administered by third parties.
The bank was ordered to:
  • develop, adopt, and maintain a written customer due diligence program that includes
    • a risk focused assessment of the customer base of the bank to determine appropriate levels of enhanced due diligence for higher risk customers
    • for high-risk customers, procedures to determine appropriate documentation to confirm identity and business activities, understand the normal and expected transactions of the customer, and reasonably ensure identification and timely, accurate and complete reporting of known or suspected criminal activity against or involving the bank.
  • advise the bank's directors of significant SARs, with detailed reports of any SARS involving employees, contractors, officers and directors.



2/29/2008 - United Bank for Africa, New York, NY
C&D Agencies: OCC Assets: Unknown
United Bank for Africa, PLC, is headquartered in Lagos, Nigeria. Its federal branch, United Bank for Africa (UBA), is located in New York, NY. On February 29, 2008, the bank consented to the OCC's issuance of a Cease and Desist order that replaced and terminated order #2007-003 (see below), issued January 18, 2007. In the earlier order, UBA was accused of failing to identify and report suspicious activity in customer accounts, in violation of 12 C.F.R. § 21.11; failing to establish and maintain a compliance program to ensure and monitor compliance with BSA requirements; and failing to establish and maintain controls and audit functions sufficient to ensure compliance with the BSA.

In November 2007, the OCC examined the federal branch of UBA and determined it was not in compliance with most of the 16 articles in the 2007 order.

Accordingly, in the new C&D Order, UBA federal branch was ordered to, among other requirements --
  • stop processing wire transfer (including ACH, Fedwire and other electronic means), dollar draft and pouch transactions for non-customers immediately , and within 45 days for customers.
    • "dollar draft" means a draft or check in U.S. dollars, available at foreign financial institutions and drawn on a U.S. correspondent account by a foreign financial institution.
    • "pouch transaction" includes the transportation of currency, monetary instruments and other negotiable instruments from outside the U.S. to the federal branch, and the processing such instruments, including money orders, traveler's checks and bank checks.
  • engage a qualified and approved consultant to review all wire transfer and dollar draft activity at the federal branch of UBA from 1/1/2007 to 2/29/2008 (or such extended period as the OCC may require), to ascertain any unusual or suspicious transactions. The UBA must file any CTRs or SARs required for any previously unreported activity revealed in that review.
  • update within 30 days and at least annually thereafter, a written comprehensive BSA risk assessment.
  • revise and implement a written program for internal controls and processes to ensure compliance with SAR filing requirements.
  • outsource the internal audit of all operations and compliance functions of the federal branch to a qualified independent third party.



2/26/2008 - Wallis State Bank, Wallis, TX
C&D Agencies: FDIC, Texas Dep't of Banking Assets: $274 Million
Wallis State Bank is a state-chartered non-member bank, and has been FDIC-insured since it was established in October 1972. Its main office is in Wallis, TX, and it has 6 other offices in the Texas. In February 2008, the bank consented to the FDIC's issuance of a Cease and Desist order.

In the C&D Order, Doral Bank was ordered to cease and desist from--
  • Operating the Bank in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) (the Bank Secrecy Act) (“BSA”), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U. S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) (“Financial Recordkeeping”), and the FDIC's BSA Rules and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326; and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (all the rules referred to in this paragraph are referred to hereinafter, collectively, as “BSA Rules”);
  • Operating the Bank without adequate supervision and direction by the Bank's board of directors and senior management of the Bank to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of Federal and State laws or regulations and to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Compliance Policy;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective BSA/AML training program to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Identification Program (“CIP”) for accounts for persons other than individuals;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program (“CDD”) to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
  • Operating the Bank without an effective system of independent testing to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules; and
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective audit policy to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules.


2/19/2008 - Doral Bank, Catano, Puerto Rico
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets: $7.7 Billion
Doral Bank is a Federal Reserve non-member, and has been FDIC-insured since it was established (under another charter) October 1981. Its main office is in Catano, PR, and it has 40 other branch offices in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In February 2008, the bank consented to the FDIC's issuance of a Cease and Desist order.

In the C&D Order, Doral Bank was ordered to cease and desist from--
  • operating in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., 12 U.S.C. § 1829b and 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and its implementing regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, and 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 (collectively referred to as “BSA”);
  • operating with an inadequate BSA/Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program (“BSA/AML Compliance Program”) to monitor and assure compliance with the BSA; and
  • operating with ineffective policies, procedures and processes to adequately screen, monitor and verify account transactions to ensure compliance with the regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), 31 C.F.R. Part 500, as well as all statutes, regulations, rules and/or guidelines issued or administered by OFAC (“OFAC Provisions”).


1/24/2008 - Sigue Corporation and Sigue, LLC, San Fernando, CA
$12M CMP
$15M forfeiture
Agencies: FinCEN and U.S. Dep't of Justice Assets: Unknown
Sigue Corporation and Sigue, LLC ("Sigue") operate a money services business headquartered in San Fernando, CA, with over 7,000 agent businesses throughout the country. Sigue agreed to the issuance of a $12 million CMP by FinCEN for violations of BSA. In addition, Sigue entered a deferred-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department on charges of failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program, and agreed to forfeit $15 million (payment of which will satisfy the FinCEN penalty).

According to the CMP Order, Sigue "failed to implement effective internal controls, designate compliance personnel and conduct effective independent testing and training to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act."

Details of FinCEN's allegations are listed in the order (linked above). Certain of Sigue's agents knowingly counseled and assisted customers in structuring transactions to avoid CTR filing requirements, and Sigue failed to file required SARs on those actions.


12/19/07 - The State Bank of Lebo, Lebo, KS
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets: $28.4 million
The State Bank of Lebo, Lebo, Kansas, is an insured state nonmember bank. It has one office. On December 19, 2007, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist order to the bank. The bank was ordered to cease several actions. Among them were violations of laws and regulations, including "[t]he requirements of Part 103 of the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 §§ 18-38."

No further details of those violations is provided in the Order.


12/3/07 - The Citizens Bank of Weir, Kansas
C&D Agencies: FDIC Assets: $8.2 million
The Citizens Bank of Weir, Kansas, is an insured state nonmember bank. It has one office. On December 3, 2007, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist order to the bank. "Operating with inadequate Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering ('BSA') and Office of Foreign Assets Control ('OFAC') Compliance Programs" was one of fourteen items on the list of actions the bank was ordered to cease.

The bank was ordered to, among other remedial actions:
  1. designate a qualified officer responsible for managing, coordinating and monitoring the bank's BSA and OFAC compliance programs.
  2. perform a comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability of its banking operations to attempts to launder money, finance terrorism, or conduct other criminal activities (“BSA/Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) risk assessment”).
  3. perform a comprehensive assessment of its OFAC risk profile (“OFAC risk assessment”).
  4. develop, adopt, and implement a revised, written BSA/AML compliance program designed to ensure compliance with the BSA, tailored to address the risk profile of the Bank identified in the BSA/AML risk assessment required above.
  5. develop, adopt and implement a revised, written program and procedures to ensure compliance with outstanding OFAC sanctions (“OFAC compliance program”), tailored to address the OFAC risk profile of the Bank identified in the OFAC risk assessment required above.
  6. independently test its revised BSA/AML and OFAC compliance programs to ensure proper controls are in place and are effective.
  7. enhance and update its training program to provide for periodic BSA/AML/OFAC training for Bank personnel and appropriate recordkeeping to document such training.
  8. develop, adopt, and implement a revised, written Customer Identification Program.
  9. search required records pursuant to "314(a)" requirements, including FinCEN 314(a) requests for the preceding 12 months of the effective date of the order and going forward.



10/30/2007 - Pan American Bank, Los Angeles, CA
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC, CA Dep't of Financial Institutions Assets: $40.5 Million (9/30/07)
Pan American Bank, Los Angeles, CA, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC and the California Department of Financial Institutions ordered the bank to stop:
(a) operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program; and
(b) operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3,regarding procedures to identify, monitor and report suspicious activities.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements.


10/18/2007 - Pan Pacific Bank, Fremont, CA
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC and CA Department of Financial Institutions Assets: $70 Million (9/30/07)
Pan Pacific Bank is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC and Department ordered the bank to stop, among other practices:

(a) operating with a board of directors which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the active management of the Bank;
(b) operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program;
(c) operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding procedures to identify, monitor, and report suspicious activities; and
(d) operating in violation of section 103.100(b)(2)(i) of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.100(b)(2)(i), regarding the failure to conduct section 314(a) Information Sharing and Search requests within the prescribed time frames.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements. There was also a "look-back" requirement that the bank research all high-risk account transactions since March 2007 for unfiled SARs and CTRs.


10/3/2007 - American Bank and Trust Company, Tulsa, OK
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $163.5 Million (9/30/07)
American Bank and Trust Company, Tulsa, OK, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:

(a) Operating the Bank in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.; the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103; the FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326; and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 353, (collectively “BSA Rules”);
(b) Operating the Bank with a board of directors that has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the management of the Bank to prevent unsafe and unsound banking practices and violation of laws or regulations and to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
(c) Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules;
(d) Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Identification Program (“CIP”) for accounts for persons other than individuals;
(e) Operating the Bank with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program (“CDD”) to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules; and
(f) Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of independent testing to ensure compliance with the BSA Rules.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements. It also included a "look back review" requirement -- to engage a qualified independent firm to review account and transaction activity for the period 3/27/06 through 3/22/07, to determine if additional SAR filings are required, and to file them.


9/14/2007 - Union Bank of California, San Francisco, CA
OCC CMP/C&D order
FinCEN CMP
CMP $10 million
Forf. $21.6 million
Agencies: FinCEN, OCC and Justice Dep't Assets: $52.6 Billion (6/30/07)
Union Bank of California, N.A., is a national bank headquartered in San Francisco. It is a subsidiary of UnionBanCal Corporation, based in San Francisco, which in turn is a majority-owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc., of Tokyo, Japan. According to the OCC's findings, Union Bank failed to adequately monitor its casa de cambio (Mexican currency exchange) accounts for suspicious activity. Beginning in 2003 and through 2005, the bank failed to timely file hundreds of SARs, which permitted the undetected laundering of millions of dollars of suspected drug trafficking proceeds. On March 23, 2005, Union Bank entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the OCC, requiring implementation of a bank-wide BSA compliance program, improved internal controls for monitoring high risk accounts and transactions, enhanced training and audit, and enhanced due diligence procedures, particularly regarding private banking customer accounts.

In the bank's 2006 BSA compliance exam, the OCC determined that Union Bank had not achieved compliance with the terms of the MOU. The bank's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) proved ineffective in detecting and reporting suspicious activity because of inadequately trained staff and ineffective oversight. Due diligence controls were insufficient for an effective SAR process.

FinCEN reported that a review of SARs filed by Union Bank in the 12 months ending January 2006 revealed over 1,000 cases of reporting fields in SAR forms left blank or incorrectly completed.

The OCC levied a $10 million Civil Money Penalty (CMP) on Union Bank, and issued a C&D replacing its 2005 MOU. FinCEN assessed a separate $10 million CMP, but waived collection if the OCC penalty is paid. In a related criminal investigation, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Deferred Prosecution Agreement and a $21.6 million forfeiture order against the bank. DOJ agreed to recommend that its case against the bank be dismissed with prejudice in 12 months, if the bank "fully implements significant anti-money laundering measures required by the agreement."


8/23/2007 - Twin City Bank, Longview, WA
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $45 Million (9/30/07)
Twin City Bank, Longview, WA, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:
(a) operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (“BSA/AML”) compliance program;
(b) operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding procedures to identify, monitor and report suspicious activities; and
(c) operating in violation of section 103.22 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22, regarding compliance with financial recordkeeping regulations.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements.


8/20/2007 - Mission Bank, Kingman, AZ
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $72.5 Million (9/30/07)
Mission Bank, Kingman, AZ, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an FDIC Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:
(a) operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) compliance program;
(b) operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding procedures to identify, monitor and report suspicious activities; and
(c) operating in violation of section 103.121 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.121, regarding procedures to establish minimum customer identification and verification requirements.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements.


8/10/2007 - First Security Bank of Washington, Mountlake Terrace, WA
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $260.4 Million (9/30/07)
First Security Bank of Washington, Mountlake Terrace, WA, is a state chartered insured non-member savings bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an FDIC Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:
(a) operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, regarding a satisfactory BSA/AMA compliance program; and
(b) operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 353.3, regarding procedures to identify, monitor and report suspicious activities.


The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements. In addition, the Bank's BSA Officer is required to complete a "look back" review of "all high-risk accounts and high-risk transactions, including but not limited to the Bank's large currency transaction reports, cash purchases of monetary instruments, wire transfer activity, and foreign exchange services for the period July 1, 2006 through January 1, 2007 (Transaction Review Period), and shall prepare and file any additional CTRs and SARs necessary based upon the review."


8/8/2007 - American Metro Bank, Chicago, IL
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC and Illinois Division of Banking Assets: $86.6 Million (9/30/07)
American Metro Bank, Chicago, IL, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of a joint Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC and Division of Banking ordered the bank to stop:
A. Operating the Bank with a Bank board of directors (“Board”) which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the executive management of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of law and regulations related to the Bank Secrecy Act.
B. Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act;
C. Failing to implement effective customer identification procedures;
D. Operating the Bank with an ineffective training program for appropriate Bank personnel to ensure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act;
E. Operating in violation of section 326.8, of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. § 326.8, and the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping Regulations, 31 C.F.R Part 103, more fully described on pages 12 through 24 of the FDIC Report of Examination dated February 5, 2007;
F. Operating the Bank with management whose practices have resulted in violations of law and regulation related to the Bank Secrecy Act.

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements. There is also a mandate for a "look back review" covering the 3 1/2 years prior to the Order for unreported suspicious activity, covering at least "the Bank's nonresident alien customers, foreign customers, cash intensive customers whether businesses or individuals, customers with high or frequent international wire transactions, customers with common addresses, customers that send wire transfers to a common beneficiary, customers that have received structured money orders, customers for whom a tax identification number was not obtained at the time of account opening, accounts that have had cash transactions from common transactors, all customers identified by the Bank as high risk, customers on whom the bank has ever filed a suspicious activity report, and all customers that are related to any of these types of customers."


8/6/2007 - First BankAmericano, Elizabeth, NJ
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $191.9 Million (9/30/07)
First BankAmericano, Elizabeth, NJ, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an FDIC Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:
(a) operating with inadequate management supervision and oversight by the Board to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of law and/or regulation;
(b) operating without a current, comprehensive written business/strategic plan;
(c) operating with inadequate management and staffing;
* - * - *
(e) violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq., 12 U.S.C. § 1829b and 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and its implementing regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 and 12 C.F.R. Part 353, and 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 (collectively referred to as “BSA”);
(f) operating with an inadequate BSA/Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program (“BSA/AML Compliance Program”) to monitor and assure compliance with the BSA; and
(g) operating with ineffective policies, procedures and processes to adequately screen, monitor and verify account transactions to ensure compliance with the regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), 31 C.F.R. Part 500, as well as all statutes, regulations, rules and/or guidelines issued or administered by OFAC (“OFAC Provisions”).

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements, and to establish a system of OFAC internal controls. There is also a requirement for an independent third-party look back review covering 6 months, to determine if there is SAR-worthy activity that has not been reported. The scope of the look back review includes (at least) "cash intensive business accounts; customers assigned a “high-risk” rating based upon their profiles and the results of the Risk Assessment, including, but not limited to, any auto dealers, professional service providers, jewelers, and freight companies; customers with high, frequent or international wire transactions; customers with financial transactions in locations linked to terrorist, drug trafficking or money laundering; and any transactions or accounts identified in the [December 18, 2006, Report of Examination] as requiring additional investigation by the [bank]."


8/3/2007 - First American International Bank, Brooklyn, NY
C & D Order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $464.2 Million (9/30/07)
First American International Bank, Brooklyn, NY, is a state chartered insured non-member bank. The bank agreed to the issuance of an FDIC Order to Cease and Desist. The FDIC ordered the bank to stop:
(a) Operating in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332, and implemented by rules and regulations issued by the United States Department of Treasury, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 and 12 C.F.R. Part 353, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(s) and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 (hereafter collectively “BSA”);
(b) operating with ineffective policies, procedures and processes to adequately screen, monitor and verify account transactions to ensure compliance with the regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), 31 C.F.R. Part 500, as well as all statutes, regulations, rules and/or guidelines issued or administered by OFAC (“OFAC Provisions”);
(c) operating with inadequate management supervision and oversight by the Insured Institution's board of directors (“Board”) to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of the BSA and OFAC Provisions;
(d) operating with an inadequate BSA/Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program (“BSA/AML Compliance Program”) to monitor and assure compliance with the BSA;
(e) operating with an inadequate system of internal controls for compliance with the BSA and OFAC Provisions;
(f) operating with an inadequate system of independent testing for compliance with the BSA and OFAC Provisions;
(g) failure to provide adequate training in BSA and OFAC Provisions;
(h) operating with ineffective policies, procedures and processes to adequately comply with the United States Department of Treasury's Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting Regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 103;
(i) operating in violation of FDIC Rules and Regulations, sections 353.3(a)(4)(i) and (iii) and United States Department of Treasury Rules and Regulations, section 103.18, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)for failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”).

The order included the standard instruction to the bank to complete identified steps to bring the bank into compliance with the BSA/AML requirements, and to establish a system of OFAC internal controls. There is also a requirement for an independent third-party look back review covering the period starting 1/1/2006 and through the date of the order, to determine if there is SAR-worthy activity that has not been reported. The scope of the look back review includes (at least) "the Insured Institution's foreign branch accounts, cash intensive business accounts, customers with high, frequent or international wire transactions and customers with financial transactions in locations linked to terrorist, drug trafficking or money laundering, including, but not limited to, the transactions or accounts identified in the [December 4, 2006 Report of Examination] as requiring additional investigation by the Insured Institution."


8/3/2007 - American Express Bank International, Miami, FL & American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., Salt Lake City, UT
C&D order
CMP $20 million (bank)
CMP $5 million (company)
Forf. $55 million (bank)
Agencies: FinCEN, FRB and Justice Dep't Assets: Unknown
American Express Bank International (AEBI) is an Edge Act corporation under the Federal Reserve Act, owned by American Express Bank Ltd. (AEB), a New York corporation. AEBI offers private banking services, primarily to high net worth customers in Latin America. American Express Travel Related Services Company (AETRSC) is an MSB. On August 3, 2007, the Federal Reserve Board issued a Cease and Desist Order and a CMP of $20 million against AEBI, and FinCEN issued a CMP against AEBI of $20 million and against AETRSC of $5 million. There is a related Deferred Prosecution Agreement and $55 million forfeiture order by the Department of Justice (DOJ) against AEBI. Cross-order payment agreements make the total effective charges, including the forfeiture, $65 million.

These actions followed a 1993 FRB C&D and CMP order against AEBI for safety and soundness deficiencies, including those in the area of BSA/AML compliance. That order was terminated on 1/7/1997, based on improvements and enhancements. DOJ investigated accounts and transactions at AEBI for the period 12/99 through 4/04. That investigation led to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement involving failure to maintain an effective AML program. DOJ alleged there were serious systemic deficiencies; that transaction monitoring and internal controls were inadequate to detect, identify and report money laundering activity. DOJ identified suspicious or illicit activity involving drug-related money laundering, via "Black Market Peso Exchange" wire transfers as part of an undercover law enforcement operation.

FRB exams identified weaknesses in the bank's BSA/AML compliance program. The bank represented in 2004 and 2005 that is was upgrading account monitoring processes, and improving controls on offshore bearer share personal investment companies (PICs) with accounts at AEBI. Yet a 9/2006 exam uncovered significant failures in BSA compliance activities, such that the bank failed to have procedures adequately designed to assure and monitor the bank's compliance with BSA and BSA regulations. Specific findings included:
  • Failure to adopt and implement comprehensive customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence processes, particularly regarding high risk customers.
  • Failure to maintain effective control measures for bearer share and other PICs.
  • Failure to adhere to bank's own written policies requiring periodic reviews of high risk accounts.
  • The bank's transaction monitoring system continued to be inadequate to the task, due to data integrity and other problems. System-identified potentially suspicious activity was not properly resolved, so the bank could not identify, monitor and report suspicious activity.
  • AEBI did not perform satisfactory independent testing of its BSA/AML program. In particular, the bank's internal audit function didn't review implementation of the bank's automated transaction monitoring system.
  • Failure to provide for adequate oversight of and accountability for the BSA/AML compliance program by management of AEBI and by its parent company, AEB, which had agreed to provide oversight.
The FRB order includes the expected litany of actions required of AEBI, including completion of the bank's transaction monitoring system. The bank also agreed to an independent review of account and transaction activity for the first half of 2007 to determine whether suspicious activity was properly identified and reported. Additional review of 2006 activity may also be required, if the FRB deems it necessary. The order specifically requires that the review be completed notwithstanding any agreement to sell AEB or AEBI to an unaffiliated third party.

FinCEN's findings parallel those of the FRB. The Order states that AEBI's "high-risk customer base, product lines, and international jurisdiction of operations required elevated measures to manage the risk of money laundering and other financial crimes. Nevertheless, the Bank conducted business without adequate systems and controls reasonably designed to manage the risk of money laundering, including the potential for Black Market Peso Exchange transactions that may be used by Colombian drug cartels to launder the proceeds of narcotics sales." FinCEN called AEBI's failures "serious, repeated and systemic."

FinCEN determined that AETRSC failed to timely make over 1,000 SAR-MSB filings from 5/7/06 through 5/7/07, involving suspicious transactions totaling over $500 million. FinCEN also reported over 2,000 errors in the 1,639 SAR-MSBs that AETRSC did file in that one-year period, and that those errors substantially diminished the value of the SARs to law enforcement.


7/26/2007 - First State Bank of Kensington, Kensington, MN
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $57 million (6/30/07)
First State Bank of Kensington is a state-chartered, non-member bank headquartered in Kensington, MN, with one office. On July 26, 2007, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist Order, requiring the bank end the following unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law or regulations:
  • Operating with management whose policies and practices are insufficient to prevent violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 et seq., and implementing regulations including 12 C.F.R. Part 326 and Part 353, and 31 C.F.R. Part 103 (hereafter collectively “Bank Secrecy Act” or “BSA”);
  • Operating with inadequate policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and report suspicious activities to Bank directors and others;
  • Operating without an effective system of independent testing for compliance with BSA requirements;
  • Operating without an adequate BSA training program for appropriate Bank personnel; and
  • Violating BSA law(s) and regulation(s), including:
    • Part 103 of the Treasury Department's Financial Record-keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103; and
    • Sections 326.8 and 353 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 326.8 and 353, respectively.


7/19/2007 - Green Belt Bank & Trust, Iowa Falls, IA
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $171 million (6/30/07)
Green Belt Bank & Trust is a state-chartered, non-member bank headquartered in Iowa Falls, IA, with four offices. On July 19, 2007, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist Order, requiring the bank end the following unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law or regulations:
  • operating without adequate oversight by the Bank's board of directors and supervision by executive management to prevent violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311-5330, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b, and 12 U.S.C. § 1951 – 1959, and regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, including 12 C.F.R. Part 326, Subpart B, 12 C.F.R. Part 353, and 31 C.F.R. Part 103 (collectively referred to as “BSA”);
  • failing to develop and continually administer a BSA compliance program;
  • operating without an effective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA, including but not limited to adequate information and communications systems to monitor and ensure compliance with recordkeeping requirements for BSA reporting;
  • operating without an effective system of independent testing for compliance with the BSA;
  • operating without an adequate BSA training program for the Bank's directors and appropriate personnel;
  • operating without an effective customer identification and verification system that complies with section 103.121 of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 103.121;
  • failing to develop and implement an adequate system for detecting and reporting suspicious activity; and
  • violating laws and regulations, including:
    • failing to develop and continually administer a BSA compliance program as required by section 326.8(b) of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8, including but not limited to an adequate Customer Identification Program, a system of internal controls sufficient to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA, a system of independent testing, and adequate training of appropriate personnel;
    • failing to comply with the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions regulation, 31 C.F.R. Part 103, including but not limited to failing to file Currency Transaction Reports (“CTRs”), failing to file CTRs in a timely manner, failing to furnish required information in CTRs, failing to aggregate multiple transactions totaling over $10,000 for reporting purposes, failing to perform annual reviews of exempt persons and document monitoring of exempt person transactions, failing to properly conduct records searches upon the request of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), failing to follow required identification procedures for reported transactions, failing to obtain required customer identification information, and failing to verify customer identification information; and
    • failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) as required by 12 C.F.R. § 353.3(a)(4) for transactions structured to evade BSA reporting requirements.



7/12/2007 - Central Progressive Bank, Lacombe, LA
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $606 million (6/30/07)
Central Progressive Bank is a state-chartered, non-member bank headquartered in Lacombe, LA, with 21 offices. On July 12, 2007, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist Order, requiring the bank to, among other changes, improve its BSA/AML compliance program as follows:
  • Within 60 days, designate a qualified officer responsible for managing, coordinating, and monitoring the Insured Institution's Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) compliance programs ("BSA Officer"). The BSA Officer shall have the responsibility and necessary authority to ensure the Insured Institution's compliance with the BSA and OFAC rules and regulations and related matters, including, without limitation, the identification of timely, accurate, and complete reporting to law enforcement and supervisory authorities of unusual or suspicious activity or known or suspected criminal activity perpetrated against or involving the Insured Institution.
  • Within 120 days, the BSA Officer shall review the Insured Institution's BSA and OFAC compliance program deficiencies and violations set forth in the Report of Examination.
  • The Insured Institution's BSA and OFAC compliance programs shall ensure the Insured Institution's future compliance with the BSA and OFAC rules and regulations, section 326.8 and Part 353 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8 and 12 C.F.R. Part 353, and with any related rules and regulations. At a minimum, the compliance programs shall include the following:
    • Procedures for the Insured Institution's customer identification program and account opening procedures;
    • Policies and procedures with respect to high-risk accounts and customers, including the adequacy of methods for identifying and conducting due diligence on high-risk accounts and customers at account opening and thereafter, and for monitoring high-risk client relationships on a transaction basis as well as by account and customer;
    • Policies, procedures, and systems for identifying, evaluating, monitoring, investigating, and reporting suspicious activity, including transactions involving high-risk customers or accounts and/or high-risk jurisdictions, and the appropriateness of the Insured Institution's criteria for designating an account as high risk and assessing the Insured Institution's procedures and systems for identifying and monitoring customer transactions in accordance with rules and regulations of the BSA and OFAC;
    • Policies and procedures regarding the identification and reporting of cash transactions;
    • Policies and procedures with respect to wire transfer recordkeeping requirements;
    • Policies and procedures for transactions involving non-customers, including, but not limited to, wire transfer services, traveler's check services, and foreign exchange services;
    • Independent annual testing for compliance with the BSA in accordance with the procedures described in section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 326.8; and
    • Establishment and documentation of training on a regular and on-going basis for management and Insured Institution personnel on all relevant aspects of laws, regulations, and Insured Institution policies and procedures relating to the BSA and OFAC compliance programs, with a specific concentration on the currency and monetary instruments reporting requirements and the reporting requirements associated with Suspicious Activity Reports, Currency Transaction Reports, and processing requirements of OFAC.


7/9/2007 - First Community Bank, Vanceburg, KY
C&D order Agencies: FDIC, Kentucky Office of Financial Institutions Assets: $27 million (6/30/07)
First Community Bank is a state-chartered, non-member bank headquartered in Vanceburg, KY, with two offices. On July 9, 2007, the FDIC and the Office of Financial Institutions for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (KOFI) issued a Cease and Desist Order, requiring the bank end the following unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law or regulations:
  • Operating the Bank without effective supervision by the board of directors and executive management to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of law and regulations related to the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330, and regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, including 12 C.F.R. Part 326, Subpart B, and 31 C.F.R. Part 103 (hereinafter collectively, “Bank Secrecy Act”);
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act;
  • Operating the Bank with an ineffective training program for appropriate Bank personnel to assure compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act;
  • Operating in violation of section 326.8, of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations, 12. C.F.R. 326.8, and the Treasury Department's Financial Recordkeeping Regulations, 31 C.F.R Part 103, more fully described [in a joint FDIC/KOFI report of exam dated] February 27, 2007;
  • Operating with management whose actions and practices have resulted in violation of law and regulation relating to Bank Secrecy Act compliance; and
  • Operating with a board of directors which has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the management of the Bank to prevent violations of law and regulation relating to Bank Secrecy Act compliance.


7/3/2007 - Bank of Commerce, Greenwood, MS
C&D order Agencies: FDIC, Mississippi Dep't of Banking and Consumer Finance Assets: $167 million (6/30/07)
Bank of Commerce is a state-chartered, non-member insured bank headquartered in Greenwood, MS, with five offices. On July 3, 2007, the FDIC and the Mississippi Dep't of Banking and Consumer Finance issued a Cease and Desist Order, requiring the bank end the following unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law or regulations:
  • Operating in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq.) (the Bank Secrecy Act) (“BSA”), the rules and regulations implementing the BSA issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (31 C.F.R. Part 103) (“Financial Recordkeeping”), the FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures Regulations, 12 C.F.R. Part 326 (“BSA Programs and Procedures”), and 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (“Suspicious Activity Reports”); and
  • Operating with a board of directors that has failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to the management of the Bank to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of laws or regulations.


7/3/2007 - Garden Savings FCU, Parsippany, NJ
C&D order Agencies: NCUA Assets: $166 million (3/31/07)
Garden Savings is a federal credit union. On July 3, 2007, the NCUA issued a C&D order requiring that Garden Savings take certain steps to address needed improvements to its BSA/AML compliance program, including:
  • Engage a qualified third party consultant to assist in correcting program deficiencies.
  • Complete a comprehensive BSA/AML risk assessment.
  • Develop and maintain a list of high and moderate risk members.
  • Back-file CTRs and SARs, including CTRs on improperly exempted businesses.
  • Implement policies to require documenting decisions not to file SARs.
  • Ensure SAR filings are kept confidential.
  • Establish written high-risk member policies and procedures within 90 days.
  • Hire a competent full-time BSA Compliance Officer with requisite authority and resources to ensure compliance.
  • Create a BSA compliance team, and dedicate sufficient staffing and resources to BSA/AML compliance, based on a written risk assessment.
  • Cross-train staff to ensure BSA compliance program continuity.
  • Obtain and research all 314(a) information sharing requests from FinCEN within 14 days of their receipt. Include 314(a) compliance in BSA Compliance Policy.
  • Develop and maintain a comprehensive BSA/AML training program within 90 days.
  • Develop and maintain risk-based internal controls and transaction monitoring tools for identification of reportable transactions.
  • Evaluate and strengthen current CIP verification processes. Expand CIP procedures to identify higher risk members, for due diligence and account monitoring.
  • Develop written procedures to direct responses to law enforcement subpoenas, notifications, requests or inquiries.
  • Require organized maintenance of all notifications from law enforcement and government agencies in a secure and readily-retrievable manner.
  • Engage a qualified independent third party to conduct BSA/AML compliance program independent testing within 120 days.
  • Review current exempt person designations for appropriateness, and document reasons for all continuing exemptions.
  • Make a monthly check of all credit union members against the OFAC SDN list.
  • OFAC training for all credit union officials, including staff, management and board members.


6/25/2007 - Orange Community Bank, Orange, CA
C&D order Agencies: FDIC, CA Dep't of Financial Institutions Assets: $199 million (6/30/07)
Orange Community Bank is an FDIC-insured non-member bank with a main office in Orange, CA, and two branch offices. On 6/25/2007, the FDIC issued the bank a Cease and Desist Order in which the bank is ordered to stop, among other practices, operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC Rules and Regulations regarding a satisfactory BSA/AML compliance program.

The bank was ordered to --
  • revise, renew, adopt and implement a written BSA compliance program that
    • establishes a system in internal controls to ensure compliance, particularly policies and procedures to detect and monitor suspicious transactions
    • provides for independent testing of BSA compliance, at least annually
    • ensures that the bank's BSA compliance program is managed by a qualified officer with requisite authority, responsibility, training, resources, and a management reporting structure to ensure compliance
    • Provides and documents BSA/AML training of all board members and appropriate personnel
  • develop, adopt and implement an effective EDD program that will
    • conduct a risk-focused assessment of the bank's customer based to determine appropriate levels of EDD needed for higher-risk categories of customers
    • develop procedures to determine appropriate documentation confirming the identity and business activities of high-risk customers, and to effectively monitor those customers' activities to identify and report suspicious activity
    • be reviewed regularly to ensure that the bank obtains and used information sufficient for the proper operation of an automated suspicious activity monitoring system (described below).
  • enhance its system to allow for periodic review of customer transactions to identify suspicious activity, so that the system can
    • consider cash transactions, wire transfers, and monetary instrument purchases or negotiations
    • utilize relevant customer data to link related businesses, accounts, and relationships, to facilitate the sorting and review of multiple transaction types and transactions over extended periods of time
    • reasonably detect structured transactions and transactions having no business or apparent lawful purpose, and those not customary for a customer.
  • develop a plan to complete a six-month look-back on all high and medium-risk accounts for suspicious activity, to file any additional SARs deemed necessary based on the review, and to report on the results of the review and SAR filings to the bank's board, the FDIC and the state Commissioner.
  • implement, customize and test any BSA/AML related modules in its existing or new software system so that the bank can have a fully functioning automated system for detecting and monitoring suspicious activity. This automated system should analyze cash transactions over a threshold amount, wire transfers, EFTs and monetary instrument purchases and deposits, with central review and full documentation of decisions for all flagged items.


5/29/07 - Covington County Bank, Collins, MS
C&D order Agencies: FDIC; MS Dep't of Banking & Consumer Finance Assets (3/31/07): $58 million
Covington County Bank is an insured state nonmember bank. On May 29, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions, including:
  • Operating in violation of the BSA, Treasury regulations at 31 CFR Part 103, the FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures regulations at 12 CFR Part 326, and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports regulations at 12 CFR Part 353.
  • Operating with a board of directors that had failed to provide adequate supervision over and direction to bank management to prevent unsafe or unsound banking practices and violations of law and regulations.
Among other requirements, the bank was ordered to
  • Have and retain a qualified BSA officer, with appropriate authority, and notify the FDIC and state banking commissioner of any changes in the bank's BSA officer
  • Complete an independent review of senior bank staff to assist the bank in achieving and maintaining a management and reporting structure for BSA compliance appropriate to the bank's size and risk profile
  • Establish procedures to review the bank's customer base to identify MSBs, to ensure that appropriate information is gathered on MSB customers, and to identify potential MSBs in daily monitoring procedures
  • Employ a qualified independent consultant to complete a customer risk assessment, to include
    • an analysis of the bank's risk assessment for customers classified as MSBs, taking into consideration the 4/26/05 interagency guidance on providing banking service to MSBs
    • the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with the bank's customers, business lines, departments, products, safekeeping services, location, and markets served
  • Adopt a comprehensive, written BSA Program based on the independent risk assessment including
    • an effective system of internal controls to ensure compliance, to include ten specific elements
    • a training program for all operational personnel with a need for BSA knowledge
    • delivery of an overview of BSA requirements to all new employees within 30 days of hire, and to all bank executives and directors
    • independent testing by an outside consultant to ensure proper controls are in place to comply
  • Take all reasonable steps, within 30 days of the order, to eliminate all apparent violations identified in the bank's 10/30/06 Report of Examination
  • Establish a board committee charged with ensuring the bank complies with the order.
  • Furnish its shareholders a description of the order


5/3/07 - Bank of Guam, Hagatna, Guam
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets (3/31/07): $799 million
Bank of Guam is an insured state nonmember bank. On May 3, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions, including operating in violation of the FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures regulations at 12 CFR Part 326, and the FDIC's Suspicious Activity Reports regulations at 12 CFR Part 353.

Among other requirements, the bank was ordered to
  1. Bring itself into compliance with "the BSA and its rules regulations" within 90 days of the Order.
  2. Within 60 days of the Order, correct all alleged violations of Parts 326 and 353 listed in an October 18, 2006, Report of Examination
  3. Update its written compliance program to ensure and maintain compliance with the BSA and related rules and regulations. The update must continue to improve the banks' system of internal controls for BSA compliance.
  4. Revise, adopt, and implement an effective wirtten customer due diligence program.
  5. Review all high-risk accounts and transactions, including CTRs, cash purchases of monetary instruments, wire transfer activity and foreign exchange services for the six months starting 6/1/06 (this is the six months prior to full implementation of a purchased automated program to aid in similar reviews)
  6. File any additional CTRs and SARs needed, based on that review
  7. Improve and implement an effective CIP


5/2/07 - United Bank for Africa, PLC, New York, NY
CMP $500K Agencies: OCC Assets (3/31/07): unknown
The OCC assessed a Civil Money Penalty of $500,000 against the New York branch of the United Bank for Africa PLC, in connection with its 1/18/2007 issuance of a C&D order (see below).


4/26/2007 - Innovative Bank, Oakland, CA
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $255 million
Innovative Bank is an insured state nonmember bank. This order follows a BSA report of visitation dated August 21, 2006, and a report of examination dated October 10, 2006. On April 26, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions, including:
  • Operating in violation of section 326.8 of the FDIC's rules and regulations (BSA compliance).
  • Operating in violation of section 353.3 of the FDIC's rules and regulations (SAR filing requirements).
Among other requirements, the bank was ordered to
  • Develop, adopt and implement a written BSA compliance program.
  • Develop, adopt and implement a written customer due diligence program, to include enhanced due diligence for appropriate customers.
  • Develop and execute a plan to review high risk accounts and transactions in the bank's Los Angeles branch to identify any CTRs and SARs that should have been filed and were not. The review is to cover the period from the opening of the branch to the implementation of the bank's automated suspicious activity monitoring system.
  • Establish and implement policies and procedures to advise directors of significant SARs and advise the audit committee of all SARs.
  • Provide for audit committee oversight of BSA compliance, and for reports at least monthly to the audit committee, and report by the audit committee on BSA matters at each board meeting.
  • Provide for internal data processing reports to facilitate BSA monitoring and CTR reporting.
  • Develop a risk profile for each business are and for the bank as a whole, with input for all branches, management and departments.
  • Consolidate and standardize all existing BSA policies and procedures.
  • Provide for comprehensive independent tests of compliance with the BSA and related regulations.
  • Inform its shareholders of the order in its next shareholder communication and with its next proxy statement or notice of a shareholder meeting (this appears to be a standard requirement for C&D orders).


4/16/2007 - Bank of Camden, Camden, TN
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $149 million
Bank of Camden is an insured state nonmember bank. On April 16, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions:
  • Operating in violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, Treasury rules at 31 CFR Part 103, FDIC's BSA Programs and Procedures regulations (12 CFR 326) and SAR regulations (12 CFR 353) -- collectively, the "BSA Rules."
  • Operating without effective board of directors oversight and management supervision to prevent violations of law relating to the BSA rules.
  • Operating with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with BSA rules.
  • Operating with an ineffective Customer Due Diligence Program, to ensure compliance with the BSA rules.
  • Operating with an ineffective system of independent testing to ensure compliance with the BSA rules.
  • Operating with an ineffective BSA rules training program for appropriate bank personnel.
Among other requirements, the bank was ordered to complete an independent review of senior staff with responsibilities related to enduring the bank's compliance with the BSA Rules. Specifically listed were the president, senior loan officer, compliance officers, BSA officers, assistant BSA officers and all teller supervisors. The purpose of the review is to assist in setting up and maintaining a management and reporting structure for BSA compliance.

The Order also included the expected laundry list of requirements for establishing and maintaining an effective BSA compliance program (found in other listings below), and steps to address each of the shortcomings listed above. Specific persons to receive BSA Rules training (not less frequently than annually) include current and new tellers; new accounts, lending, bookkeeping, wire transfer and proof personnel; senior management and the bank's directors.



3/16/2007 - Ocean Bank, Miami FL
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $5.9 billion
Ocean Bank is an insured state nonmember bank. On March 16, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions:
  • Operating without effective board of directors oversight and management supervision to prevent violations of law relating to the BSA and OFAC regulations.
  • Operating with an ineffective system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance with BSA/OFAC rules.
  • Operating without effective coordinating and monitoring procedures by a designated individual responsible for ensuring day-to-day compliance with the BSA/OFAC rules.
  • Operating without an effective CIP.
The bank was ordered to --
  • Within 60 days of the order, develop, adopt, and implement a written plan for compliance with BSA/OFAC rules and CIP, including
    • a system of internal controls, policies and procedures to detect and monitor transactions to ensure compliance with BSA rules, specifically addressing the opening and monitoring of accounts with frequent wire and check activity.
    • procedures for CIP and account opening
    • policies and procedures for high-risk accounts and customers, and for monitoring high-risk client relationships on a transaction basis and by account and customer
    • policies, procedures and systems for identifying, evaluating, monitoring, investigating, and reporting suspicious activity, particularly involving high risk customers or accounts and high risk jurisdictions
    • policies and procedures regarding identification and reporting of cash transactions.
    • policies and procedures on wire transfer recordkeeping requirements
    • designation of a senior bank official as BSA Officer, responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance with BSA/OFAC rules. This individual will report directly to a board BSA committee (see below).
    • adequate, qualified staffing for BSA compliance.
    • independent annual testing for compliance with the BSA
    • appropriate training for the bank relating to BSA/OFAC rules.
  • Within 60 days of the order, review, enhance and implement a written customer CIP, to be approved by regulators.
  • Within 30 days, establish a board committee of at least five members (with a majority being non-officers of the bank), to oversee compliance with BSA/OFAC rules.
  • Within 120 days of the order, update the bank's overall BSA risk assessment.
  • Within 90 days of the order, revise bank BSA policy to provide for
    • risk rating of customers
    • comprehensive monitoring of high-risk accounts, with full use of account monitoring software
    • systems for account aggregation to ensure sufficient data to determine whether SARs and CTRs should be filed
    • methods for maintaining and controlling documentation and monitoring accounts of the private banking department, including embassy and PEP accounts, entities with bearer shares, foreign nationals, private investment companies and other offshore entities
    • procedures for handling pouch transactions under appropriate controls
    • standards for opening accounts
    • methods for enforcing the bank's policies regarding BSA/OFAC rules.
  • Within 60 days, implement a written customer due diligence program.


3/7/2007 - United Roosevelt Savings Bank, Carteret, NJ
C&D order Agencies: FDIC Assets: $93.3 million
United Roosevelt is an insured state nonmember bank. On March 7, 2007, the FDIC issued the bank an order to cease and desist from certain actions:
  • operating in violation of the Bank Secrecy Act and implementing regulations.
  • operating with inadequate management supervision and oversight by its board of directors to prevent unsafe or unsound practices and violations of the BSA.
  • operating with an inadequate BSA/AML compliance program.
  • failure to have an adequate written CIP.
  • operating with inadequate internal controls for BSA compliance.
  • operating with inadequate system for independent testing for BSA compliance.
  • failure to provide adequate BSA training.
  • operating with ineffective policies, procedures and processes ("3P") to comply with 31 CFR Part 103.
  • operating with ineffective 3P for screening, monitoring and verifying account transactions for OFAC compliance.
The bank was ordered to --
  • develop, adopt and implement a system of internal controls for compliance with the BSA, to include policies, procedures and processes on-
    • BSA/AML risk assessments to be conducted immediately and every 12 to 18 months thereafter
    • Customer due diligence, in conjunction with CIP
    • High risk account identification and monitoring
    • Enhanced due diligence for high-risk customers
    • Large cash transaction/funds transfers/monetary instrument monitoring for suspicious activity
    • Monitoring, detecting and reporting suspicious activity.
    • Customer exemptions from CTR filing
    • CIP
    • BSA/AML staffing and resources
    • wire transfer transactions
  • develop, adopt and implement internal controls to ensure compliance with OFAC regulations taking into consideration its customers, their geographic locations, the types of accounts, products and services offered, and the geographic areas in which they are offered
  • establish independent testing programs for compliance with BSA and OFAC regulations, at least annually, using audit procedures and auditors with experience commensurate with the bank's BSA/AML risk level.
  • deliver responsibility-specific BSA/OFAC training to all personnel, including directors and management.
  • designate a qualified BSA and OFAC officer or officers.
  • develop, adopt and implement policies, procedures and processes to comply with section 314(a) of USAPA.
  • include reviews of compliance with BSA and OFAC rules in routine internal and external audits (in addition to independent testing)
  • periodically report to the bank's Audit Committee any law enforcement inquiry relating to BSA or OFAC, and criminal subpoena received, and any action taken or response provided to such inquiry or subpoena.
  • engage a qualified independent firm to "look back" to review account and transaction activity from 1/1/2006 to the date of the order to determine if suspicious activity within or through the bank was properly identified and reported, and
  • complete the filing of any omitted SARs.


2/21/2007 - Dover N.J. Spanish American Credit Union
C&D order Agencies: NCUA Assets: $15 million
The Dover N.J. Spanish American Credit Union agreed in February 2007 to the issuance by NCUA of a Cease and Desist Order. The order imposes significant demands upon the credit union, which appears not to have had an acceptable formal BSA/AML compliance program. Among the tasks the credit union must complete are (with deadlines counted from the date of the order):
  • Engage, within 30 days, a consultant to assist in correcting BSA/AML program deficiencies.
  • Complete, within 30 days, a comprehensive BSA/AML risk assessment, including the development of a list of high and moderate risk members.
  • Ensure that high-risk member account activity is reviewed monthly, and moderate risk member activity is reviewed quarterly.
  • Designate a full-time, competent BSA Compliance Officer within 10 days of the order, and train that individual.
  • Within 30 days of the order, approve and submit to NCUA a detailed job description for the BSA Officer.
  • Enhance monitoring of cash transactions and outgoing wires.
  • Improve internal controls and monitoring tools to ensure that all reportable transactions are identified. Include sales and redemptions of monetary instruments, incoming wires, ATM transactions and others identified in the Risk Assessment.
  • Ensure that CTRs and SARs are timely, accurately, and completely filed.
  • Within 15 days, start using FinCEN's BSA Direct E-filing system.
  • Maintain security and secrecy of SARs.
  • Within 60 days, complete the back filing of CTRs and SARs to 2001. Consider hiring temporary help to assume routine credit union assignments so that knowledgeable staff may complete this review.
  • Complete a monthly check of member names against the OFAC SDN list.
  • Train personnel on use of the credit union's OFAC software.
  • Train all staff and officials, including board members, on OFAC requirements within 30 days.
  • Research FinCEN § 314(a) requests on a timely basis. Obtain missed requests and search records within 10 days and weekly thereafter.
  • Establish written CIP processes, including the verification of tax ID numbers.
  • Ensure timely and accurate follow up on IRS report errors or mismatch notifications.
  • Verify SSNs, EINs and ITINs for all members joining since 1/1/2000, and file SARs for any that cannot be verified within 90 days.
  • Identify all members who are MSBs, and establish an effective MSB monitoring program, within 30 days. Close all MSB accounts for which due diligence cannot be completed in that time frame.
  • Ensure that all business accounts -- and personal accounts with business activity -- are identified within 90 days.
  • Within 60 days, develop and implement due diligence and monitoring processes for business accounts.
  • Within 45 days, develop and implement a comprehensive BSA/AML "top to bottom" training program<
  • Within 120 days, engage a qualified independent third party for independent testing of the BSA/AML compliance program, to be completed within 180 days. Ensure annual independent testing thereafter.


2/12/2007 - Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Assn, Sidney OH
C&D order Agencies: OTS Assets: $138.8 million
Note: Links to OTS source documents are no longer available.

Peoples Federal S&L received a Cease and Desist Order from the OTS on 2/12/07. The OTS "concluded that there were weaknesses in the 'independent review' component of the Association's BSA Compliance Program, and that the Association had failed to identify and file Suspicious Activity Reports with respect to a few suspected instances of 'structured' customer financial transactions."

The Order requires Peoples Federal to adopt and implement a Corrective Plan that provides for
  • an enhanced customer due diligence procedures for all "higher-risk" customers, to be employed prior to account opening for new accounts of such customers.
  • additional employee training to facilitate identification of structured and other suspicious transactions, and the prompt and accurate filing of SARs.
  • effective independent testing for [BSA] compliance.
  • timely corrective action regarding other BSA-related comments in the most recent Report of Examination.
The association's board or a committee was ordered to monitor the implementation of the Corrective Plan on at least a monthly basis, submit bi-monthly written status reports to the OTS, and ensure that the association's BSA Compliance Program is kept updated to adjust to changes in the association's operations and changes to BSA laws, regulations and related forms.



2/12/2007 - The International Bank of Miami, N.A.
CMP: $250,000 Agencies: OCC Assets 9/30/06: $807 million
The International Bank of Miami, N.A., Coral Gables, Florida, is alleged to have violated the Bank Secrecy Act; to have engaged in unsafe and unsound practices when it failed to supervise adequately its Capital Markets Group (CMG); and to have failed to ensure that CMG's securities transactions were conducted safely, soundly, and legally. Specifically, the OCC's order alleges that the bank:
  • Violated the BSA and 31 CFR 103.33(a) [records of loan transactions] by permitting CMG to maintain records that frequently failed to adequately identify a legitimate business purpose for loans, or fully and adequately describe the nature and purpose of loans (loans were described merely as being for "working capital").
  • Failed to maintain a system of controls to monitor and report suspicious activity.
  • Failed to adequately identify and monitor accounts of politically-exposed persons (PEPs).
  • Failed to monitor loans accounts and payments for suspicious activity.
  • Did not have an adequate training program on detecting and reporting suspicious activity.
  • Permitted CMG to make loans that did not conform to the bank's own lending policies, and to omit obtaining proper authorization for large credits.
  • Allowed CMG to provide incomplete or inadequate loan documentation and recordkeeping, not in accordance with bank policies.
  • Failed to do adequate customer due diligence, especially for high-risk customers.
  • Allowed CMG to maintain an inadequate record of its securities transactions.
  • Permitted OMG to engage in securities transactions in violation of OCC regulations.
  • Allowed CMG to conduct securities transactions with high-risk countries without risk management procedures.


1/29/2007 - Banc of America Investment Services, Inc.
CMP: $3 million Agencies: NASD Assets: Unknown
Banc of America Investment Services, Inc. (BAI), is a non bank subsidiary of Bank of America, N.A. NASD is a private-sector provider of financial regulatory services. It enforces both its own rules and federal security laws. NASD announced that it fined BAI $3 million in connection with BAI's "failure to obtain customer information for certain high-risk accounts and for failing to have adequate communication with its parent bank to ensure that BAI's independent suspicious activity report (SAR) filing obligations were met." NASD stated that BAI:
  • Failed to conform to its own established anti-money laundering procedures with respect to 34 high-risk accounts involving trust and private investment corporations apparently linked to one family and domiciled in the Isle of Man (noted for its acceptance of offshore banking). These accounts engaged in multi-million-dollar international wire transfers. It is stated that BAI
    • Failed to require the names of beneficial owners.
    • Failed to restrict activity in the accounts, in spite of not knowing the beneficial owners.
    • Permitted international wire transfers without knowing the beneficial owners of the accounts.
    • Ignored advice from an in-house senior lawyer that the names of the beneficial owners should be obtained.
    • Ignored its own risk committee's determination that the names must be obtained.
    • Ignored repeated requests from its clearing firm for the beneficial owner information.
    • Ignored notices from its clearing firm pointing out indicia of money-laundering activity.
  • Had an inadequate compliance program for reporting suspicious transactions. BAI relied on its parent bank to determine whether SARs should be filed, but communications between BAI and its parent were inadequate for that purpose.


1/18/2007 - United Bank for Africa, New York, NY
C&D Order Agency: OCC Assets: Unknown
United Bank for Africa, PLC, is headquartered in Lagos, Nigeria. Its federal branch, United Bank for Africa, is located in New York, NY. On January 18, 2007, the bank consented to the OCC's issuance of a Cease and Desist order related, at least in part, to problems with the bank's compliance with BSA/AML and OFAC laws and regulations. In the order, the bank is directed to --
  • Provide for compliance with the BSA and with regulations at 31 CFR Part 103 and 12 CFR Part 21, and the rules and regulations of OFAC (collectively, "BSA").
  • Perform, within 45 days and at least annually thereafter, a written comprehensive BSA risk assessment consistent with guidance in the 2006 FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual.
  • Within 90 days, develop a comprehensive written BSA Program, including
    • internal controls, independent testing and auditing to ensure compliance with BSA, OFAC and CIP requirements
    • identification of beneficial owners of all depository and loan accounts at the branch
    • a process for linking accounts across business lines to evaluate activity patterns
    • procedures to ensure CTRs are filed as required
    • definitions and guidance for identification of high risk accounts, including embassy and PEP accounts
    • procedures, including due diligence, for opening new accounts, with particular attention to
      • money remitters and money service businesses
      • embassy and PEP accounts
      • import/export companies
      • jewelry and precious metal dealers
      • foreign exchange businesses
      • off shore corporations
      • accounts with wire transfer, demand draft or pouch activity
    • improved monitory for credits at the New York branch to ensure managers understand ownership structures or its obligors and can detect affiliated relationships
    • improved due diligence procedures for foreign correspondent accounts
    • recordkeeping on funds transfers, as required by the BSA
    • procedures designed to enhance detection and reporting of suspicious activity patterns
    • a training program to ensure awareness of an compliance with BSA and OFAC requirements, including CTRs, monetary instrument and funds transfer recordkeeping, and SARs
    • delegation of responsibility for filing CTRs and CMIRs
    • guidelines on certifications for foreign correspondent accounts
  • Within 30 days, develop and implement a written program and system of internal controls to ensure compliance with requirements to file SARs
  • Within 60 days, outsource the branch's internal audit of operational and compliance functions to an independent third party.
  • Within 60 days, stop processing transactions for non customers until the branch has established and received approval for policies, procedures and controls to ensure due diligence and reporting of transactions under the BSA of suspicious activity.
  • Immediately cease transporting negotiable instruments and cash off branch premises except by bonded courier, and in accordance with the branch's BSA policies and procedures.
Note: This order was replaced 2/29/08. Click HERE for additional information.


12/27/2006 - Beach Bank, Miami Beach, FL
CMP: $800,000 Agencies: FinCEN, FDIC, Florida Office of Financial Regulation Assets as of 9/30/06: $127 million
Beach Bank agreed to imposition of CMP, without an admission of guilt. Failure to implement adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with BSA and manage risks of money laundering. Specific problems listed included:
  • Failure to fully investigate activity of three of its 40 MSB customers to determine if it was suspicious. The three collectively withdrew over $615 million in cash over 18 months.
    • Bank received federal subpoenas, so it had knowledge customers were being investigated.
    • Bank knew of cash activity, because it filed CTRs on it.
  • Failed to review available audits of its MSB customers to monitor risk of potential money laundering in those accounts.
  • Failed to monitor its more than 200 identified high risk accounts, in spite of policy to do so.
  • Lack of controls to monitor funds transfers for suspicious activity. There was over $1 Billion transferred over 21 months. One telecommunications company moved $100 million in two months, but the bank had no file documents to back up that level of phone card sales and telecom services.
  • Failed to timely file suspicious activity reports. Because of inadequate anti-money laundering procedures, the bank failed to detect and report on a timely basis on at least 67 cases related to over $1.6 billion in suspicious activity.


12/14/2006 - The Foster Bank, Chicago, IL
CMP: $2 million Agencies: FinCEN Assets as of 12/31/05: $428 million
The Foster Bank agreed to the imposition of the CMP, without an admission of guilt. Failure to implement adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with BSA and manage risks of money laundering. The activity in question took place during or prior to a 2002 FDIC examination. Specific problems listed included:
  • The bank issued $130 million in cashier's checks in eight months of 2002, without adequate anti-money laundering procedures and controls. The bank is located in both a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and a High Risk Money Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Area (HIFCA).
  • The bank failed to have a customer due diligence program to identify expected or reasonable customer activity.
  • The bank failed to use its large currency transaction log to identify structuring over multiple-day periods.
  • The bank incorrectly exempted two MSBs for at least 18 months. This resulting in late filing of at least 674 CTRs totaling over $35 million in transactions.
  • The bank's independent review of its BSA program was not adequate. Two outside firms failed to identify the bank's monitoring weaknesses.
  • The scope of the independent BSA review was inadequate, given the high volume of funds transfers to "Jurisdictions of Primary Concern" for money laundering, and the large volume of monetary instrument transactions at the bank.
  • The bank failed at least 12 times to make timely SAR filings.
    • Customer operating sportswear business structured nearly $10 million in cash transactions from April 1999 - November 2002.
    • Another customer routinely made cash deposits of $9,900 up to four times a day, with no apparent business purpose.
    • Other customers made large currency transactions of from $300K to $600K per month, some apparently structured, with no apparent legitimate reason.
  • The bank filed SARs that omitted significant relevant information.
    • In one case, the bank failed to include pre-1999 activity involving wires to Pakistan, India, and United Arab Emirates, understating overall dollar volume by $22 million.
    • In another, the bank omitted information on daily structuring activity in other customer accounts.
  • Former bank president structured $419,000 in bank transactions on behalf of his son's business and $122,000 on behalf of a former bank director.



10/31/2006 - Israel Discount Bank of New York, New York, NY
CMP:
$12 million
Agencies: FinCEN, FDIC, NY State Banking Department Assets as of 6/30/2006: $9.7 Billion
The Bank, which is the U.S. subsidiary of Israel Discount Bank Ltd. (Israel), agreed to the imposition of the CMP, without an admission of guilt. Failure to implement adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with BSA and manage risks of money laundering, and failure to conduct adequate independent testing of its BSA program, and to adequately staff the compliance function. Specific problems listed included:
  • Deficient documentation of customer information to adequately assess risk for money laundering.
  • Failure to link customer accounts with common ownership to facilitate detection of suspicious activity.
  • Failure to adequately review documentation for high-risk foreign accounts, such as non-bank financial institutions in Latin America.
  • Lack of adequate systems and controls to monitor wire transfers for money laundering or other suspicious activity.
  • 181,000 wires in a year, totaling $35.4 Billion, with originators or beneficiaries with money-laundering characteristics.
  • Failure to follow up on alerts from inadequate automated monitoring system.
  • Failure to have adequate controls and monitoring procedures over activity in accounts of its own subsidiary, DBLA.
  • Independent testing program was inadequate.
  • Failure to adequately staff its compliance function with persons responsible for monitoring day-to-day compliance with BSA.
  • Failure to make timely SAR filings, and failure to monitor on-going activity in accounts it had filed SARs on.
  • Filing of incomplete or inaccurate SARs.



10/31/2006 - Douglas C. Roesch, former employee of First Federal Bank of Ohio, Galion, OH
CMP:
$7,500; Order of Prohibition
Agency: OTS Assets N/A
Roesch was employed by First Federal Bank until mid-August, 2006. He was responsible for filing CTRs and SARs on behalf of the Bank. According to the Order, during 2005 and 2006, he:
  • Failed to file more than 200 CTRs prepared by Bank staff.
  • Failed to file several staff-prepared SARs.
  • Failed to notify the Bank's management of his failure to make the filings.
  • Led management and "a review firm" to believe that the filings had been made.



7/20/2006 - Deprez's Quality Jewelry and Loans, Inc., Louisville, KY
CMP: $25,000 Agencies: FinCEN, IRS (BSA regulator) Assets unknown (MSB)
Deprez Jewelry is an MSB (check casher) with one location. Specific problems listed included:
  • Failure to file timely registration as MSB with FinCEN.
  • Failure to have written anti-money laundering program until required by IRS.
  • Program created in 2004 was inadequate.
  • Deliberate policy-based structuring of transactions to evade CTR requirements.



5/19/2006 - Liberty Bank of New York, New York, NY
CMP: $600,000 Agencies: FinCEN, FDIC, NY State Banking Department Assets as of 12/31/2005: $58 million
Liberty Bank maintained an inadequate system of internal controls for BSA compliance, failed to designate anyone to coordinate and monitor day-to-day BSA compliance. Specific problems listed included:
  • Lack of adequate policies, procedures and controls for detection and reporting of suspicious transactions.
  • Failure to describe responsibility for detecting, evaluating and reporting of suspicious activity.
  • Failure to obtain enough information on customers, especially those in cash-intensive businesses.
  • Patchwork, undocumented process for monitoring transaction activity.
  • Inadequate searches of records in response to section 314(a) requests.
  • Failure to make timely SAR filings, and failure to include adequate narrative information in filed SARs.



5/9/2006 - Frosty Food Mart, Tampa, FL
CMP:
$10,000
Agencies: FinCEN, IRS (examining authority)
Assets unknown
Frosty Food Mart is a money services business (MSB), operated as a sole proprietorship by Jose A. and Zoila Balda. Frosty provided check cashing, wire transfer and money order services until January 2004. Since then, Frosty has continued to operate as a check casher and MSB. Frosty operates in central Florida, an area designated as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). Specific problems listed included:
  • Failure to establish and implement an anti-money laundering program as required by regulations.
    • Check cashing without controls designed to ensure compliance with BSA.
    • Failure to conduct independent testing of its AML program.
    • Failure to designate an individual responsible for day-to-day compliance with BSA.
    • Failure to train personnel to ensure compliance with BSA.
  • Reckless disregard toward AML requirements of BSA led to failure to file CTRs.
    • IRS reminded Frosty twice prior to 2003 of its duty to file CTRs for single and multiple transactions.
    • After those warnings, Frosty continued to totally disregard the CTR requirements.
    • Failed to file 68 CTRs for 25 customers (total of over $1 million in cash) for single-check transactions.
    • Failed to file 12 CTRs on multiple transactions on same day, for eight customers.



4/26/2006 - BankAtlantic, Fort Lauderdale, FL
CMP:
$10 million
Agencies: FinCEN, OTS (C&D Order), Justice Department (Deferred Prosecution Agreement)
Assets as of 9/30/2005: $6 Billion
Bank maintained an inadequate system of internal controls for BSA compliance. Handled over 100,000 funds transfers per year. Primary market (South Florida) is designated as both a HIFCA and a HIDFA. Clientele included nonresident aliens, offshore businesses, consulates and politically-exposed persons (PEPs). Specific problems listed included:
  • Lack of adequate policies, procedures and controls for compliance with BSA and manage money-laundering risk.
  • Lack of adequate policies, procedures and controls for detection and reporting of suspicious transactions.
  • Failure to ensure review of subpoenaed accounts for suspicious activity.
  • Failure to have adequate systems to monitor wire transfers for suspicious activity.
  • Failure to have systems for detection and reporting of multi-day cash structuring.
  • A branch of the bank catered to high income/net worth individuals, without effective customer due diligence or transaction controls and monitoring.
  • Employees were able to initiate large dollar wire transfers without oversight.
  • Failure to detect/report suspicious activity by foreign unlicensed MSBs.
  • Lack of risk analysis on high-risk clients.
  • Lack of oversight for pouch activity deposits
  • Deficient program for independent testing of BSA program, and failure of audit and management to follow up on significant identified deficiencies.
  • Failure of the bank's designated BSA compliance officer to monitor and coordinate compliance on an enterprise-wide basis.
  • Inadequate job-specific training to ensure BSA compliance.
  • Failure to make timely SAR filings, which impaired the usefulness of those SARs that were filed late. More than 360 SARs were delinquent, covering over $189 in suspicious transactions.



4/18/2006 - The Home Building and Loan Company, Greenfield, OH
CMP:
$15,000
Agency: OTS Assets on 3/31/2006:
$39.1 million
Note: Links to OTS source documents are no longer available.

The Home Building and Loan Company is regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision. In this order, it was cited for:
  • Failure to fully comply with C&D Order dated 4/12/2005.
  • Failure to adequately amend its AML program to ensure compliance with BSA laws and regulations and other requirements in the C&D Order.
  • Failure to timely comply with a requirement of the C&D Order calling for an appropriate and effective written compliance management program.
The 4/12/2005 C&D Order suggests significant shortcomings in the institution's AML program, OFAC compliance, and SAR filing policies and procedures. There appear to have been significant other compliance problems, including RESPA violations.



3/24/2006 - Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Federal Branch, New York, NY
CMP:
$150,000
Agency: OCC Assets unknown
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company is headquartered in Manila, Philippines. Their Federal Branch in New York was cited for:
  • Failure to follow its (the bank's) policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act.
  • lacking adequate systems and controls to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act.
  • Failure to make timely SAR filings.



3/24/2006 - Tonkawa Tribe of OK and Edward E. Street, Tonkawa, OK
CMP:
$1.0 million (Tribe);
$1.5 million (Street)
Agencies: FinCEN, IRS (examining authority) 2004 Net Income:
$2 million
Casino assets 12/31/2004:
$5 million
The Tonkawa Tribe has been recognized as a self-governing tribe of Native Americans since 1938. A gaming establishment (Tonkawa Bingo and Casino - the "Casino") was licensed by the Tonkawa Tribal Gaming Commission. Under the BSA and regulations, the Tribe and Street were each a "partner, director, officer, or employee" of the Casino. The Tribe owned the premises; Street operated the Casino, and shared with the Tribe in its profits. Off-track betting accounted for most of the gaming activity of the Casino, which was operated in violation of several BSA provisions. Specific problems listed included:
  • Accounts at the Casino operated by agents for principals unrelated to the Tribe or the business.
  • Principals and agents who managed those accounts from remote locations, using "subagents" at the business.
  • Failure of the Casino to adopt a written program for BSA compliance.
  • Failure to adopt internal controls designed to manage money-laundering risk and comply with BSA.
  • Disregard of regulatory requirement for detection and reporting of suspicious activity.
  • Failure to monitor for and report suspicious activity of persons identified as suspected money launderers and racketeers.
  • Failure of independent audits to test compliance with requirements to file SARs, internal controls, and other requirements for compliance with BSA.
  • Failure to provide BSA training to employees.
  • Failure to designate an individual responsible for compliance with BSA or SAR filing requirements (other than filing CTRs).
  • Failure to obtain and verify required identification information from account principals, or to ensure that agents had done so.
  • Failure to use installed automated system to identify suspicious transactions.
  • Failure to maintain complete and accurate records on funds transfers and other transactions.
  • Failure to file SARs in spite of false ID information, sham corporations and other schemes to disguise the true identity of account principals.
  • Failure to detect and file SARs on transactions involving large sums with no apparent business or lawful purpose.
  • Failure to file CTRs, including one on $300,000 in cash deposited into Casino accounts at one time.
  • Deliberate structuring of currency transactions of the Casino with banks to avoid CTR filings.
  • Failure of the Tonkawa Tribe, through its Tribal Gaming Commission, to ensure Casino compliance with BSA and other requirements.



12/29/2005 - Oppenheimer & Company, Inc., New York, NY
CMP:
$2.8 million
Agencies: FinCEN, New York Stock Exchange (examining authority) 2004 Net Income:
$45.8 Million
Assets on 6/30/2005:
$1.9 Billion
Oppenheimer is a securities broker dealer. It was cited for deficiencies in its anti-money laundering program and resulting failure to identify and report suspicious transactions, during the period from April 2002 through 2004. Specific problems listed included:
  • Inadequate internal controls for ensuring compliance with the BSA and implementing regulations, especially those requiring SARs.
  • Failure to detect and report suspicious journal transactions and wire transfers in one of Oppenheimer's foreign offices and a Florida office.
  • Failure to aggregate wire transfers by customer, account, office or destination to see a true picture of total money movements.
  • Failure to review accounts with post office addresses, including a large number of apparently unrelated persons showing the same home or business address (post office boxes or "care of" addresses in Florida.
  • Failure to provide for independent testing of BSA compliance, and permitting Internal Audit to play a supervisory role in reporting suspicious activity.
  • Failure to adequately staff for coordination and monitoring of BSA compliance. One officer and one analyst, both with other duties, were assigned to this role, when Oppenheimer had 1,600 registered representatives at over 100 branch offices serving 360,000 customers.
  • Failure to have a BSA compliance training program tailored to job responsibilities.
  • Failure to timely file SARs involving several million dollars in transactions in 2003.
  • Filing incomplete SARs involving a foreign branch.



12/19/2005 - ABN AMRO Bank, N.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands
CMP:
$80 million
Agencies: FinCEN, Federal Reserve System, OFAC, NY State Banking Department, Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, De Nederlandische Bank N.V. (Dutch Bank regulator) Assets on 12/31/2004:
$830 Billion
The North American Regional Clearing Center (the "Center"), a unit within the New York branch of ABN AMRO, operated as a clearing institution for funds transfers in U.S. dollars. Beginning in 1998, ABN AMRO added more than 100 Russian financial institutions as clients. The Center processed about 30,000 funds transfers per day. ABN AMRO's New York branch failed to apply an adequate system of internal controls for compliance with the BSA and management of the risk of money laundering at the Center. Specific problems listed included:
  • Lack of adequate documentation to assess the potential for money laundering and risk rate financial institutions with correspondent relationships with the Center.
  • Failure to document that ABN AMRO ever conducted adequate due diligence on correspondent financial institution clients of the Center.
  • Failure to adequately monitor funds transfers processed by the Center for potential suspicious activity. Relied on one employees and manual monitoring under 2002. An automated system installed in 2002 was inadequate because it lacked data needed to evaluate the activity it was reviewing.
  • Failure to incorporate available information on "shell companies" into the monitoring system. Some of these shell companies disguised the identity of Russian criminals.
  • Failure to add to the monitoring system information on institutions included in SARs filed, or information on correspondent accounts closed, by ABN AMRO. One institution in a former Soviet Union Republic was reported in a SAR in January 2002, and ABN AMRO closed all correspondent accounts of that institution in July 2002. The barred institution opened accounts with institutions holding correspondent accounts through the Center, and the Center processed more than $100 million in transfers involving the institution via those correspondents without detecting the suspicious activity.
  • Failure to investigate alerts from its automated monitoring system concerning transactions appearing to be suspicious.
  • Failure to adequately staff the compliance function at the New York ABN AMRO branch to coordinate and monitor BSA compliance.
  • Failure to adequately train staff in BSA compliance and in detection and reporting of suspicious activity.
  • Failure to file, and delinquent filing of, SARs; filing of incomplete or inaccurate SARs.



10/11/2005 - Banco de Chile, Federal Branch, New York, NY
CMP:
$3 million
Agency: OCC Assets unknown
Banco de Chile is headquartered in Santiago, Chile. The Federal Branch of Banco de Chile in New York was cited for:
  • Permitting certain customers to mask the true beneficiary of deposit accounts and loans at the branch
  • Failure to conduct adequate due diligence on the source of funds for new account or the purpose of loans.
  • Failure to monitor the same accounts for suspicious activity and to file SARs in a timely manner.
  • Making false, misleading and inaccurate statements to examiners about knowledge of nominee relationships between customers.



8/17/2005 - Federal Branch of Arab Bank PLC, New York, NY
$24 million Agencies: FinCEN, OCC Assets on 12/31/2004:
$27 Billion
The New York branch of Arab Bank was cited for failure to implement an adequate anti-money laundering program, and for violating the suspicious activity reporting requirements of the BSA. The New York branch served as an intermediary institution, as a clearing institution for U.S. dollar funds transfers on a global basis. The penalty was preceded by OCC enforcement actions requiring Arab Bank to convert its New York branch to an uninsured agency office and to shut down its wire transfer operations. Specific problems listed included:
  • Failure to implement adequate system of internal controls to comply with the BSA and manage the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in its funds transfer operation.
  • Limiting its focus of controls to transactions of its own customers, ignoring transactions for which it was merely an intermediary.
  • Failure to include adequate procedures to incorporate identifying and other information on originators and beneficiaries in an in-house developed automated monitoring system.
  • Failure to obtain adequate information on the potentially suspicious nature of funds transfers cleared by Arab Bank, including information on accounts frozen or monitored by regulatory and law enforcement authorities.
  • Failure to use publicly-available information from reliable sources that would have identified funds transfer parties as deserving of extra monitoring for suspicious activity.
  • Failure to adequately pursue anomalies identified in manual reviews. Acceptance of "we know this customer" from other Arab Bank Group members.
  • Failure to implement adequate procedures for independent testing.
  • Failure to file, and delinquent filing of, SARs.



6/20/2005 - Newton Federal Bank, Covington, GA
CMP:
$6,400
Agency: OTS Assets on 3/31/05:
$231.4 million
Note: Links to OTS source documents are no longer available.

Newton Federal is a "savings association" whose primary federal regulator is the Office of Thrift Supervision. According to the Order, Newton Federal failed to comply with the BSA in its completion of CTRs. Specifically, the Order states that Newton Federal:
  • Filed CTRs with multiple errors and omissions of required information.
  • Failed to identify the method used to verify an individual's identity;
  • Failed to include all required information; and
  • Failed to ensure the accuracy of the information that was included on CTRs.



2/23/2005 - City National Bank, Beverly Hills, CA
CMP:
$750,000
Agency: OCC Assets on 12/31/2004:
$14 Billion
OCC consent orders are generally quite limited in the detail they provide, and this order is no exception. City National Bank was cited for:
  • Failure to comply with BSA compliance program requirements for internal controls and an independent audit function.
  • Failure to apply required enhanced due diligence policies, procedures, and controls to detect and report money laundering through private banking accounts of non-U.S. persons, and to detect and report transactions deriving from foreign corruption and involving private banking accounts of politically-exposed persons.
  • Failure to make timely SAR filings.



10/12/2004 - AmSouth Bank of Birmingham, Birmingham, AL
CMP:
$10 million
Agencies: FinCEN, Federal Reserve Board; concurrent C&D from FRB and Alabama Superintendent of Banks Holding Company Assets on 12/31/2003:
$45.6 Billion
The bank was cited for willful violation of the anti-money laundering program and SAR requirements of the BSA and regulations. Specific problems listed included:
  • Inadequate board and management oversight of AML program.
  • The bank's fragmented program lacked communication of suspicious activity information to those responsible for filing SARs.
  • Inadequate internal controls and procedures to integrate information from numerous bank units to enable compliance with BSA and Section 314(a) search requirements.
  • Monetary instrument sales information was not readily searchable.
  • Legal Department had no system to alert BSA compliance personnel to subpoenas and information requests from law enforcement.
  • Legal also failed to notify BSA or Security personnel of suspicious activity information learned through litigation activity.
  • Failure to include in policies and procedures information about identification of suspicious activity or reportable events, or procedures to be followed when such and event was identified.
  • Inadequate reporting to management.
  • Failure to provide bank-wide training on detecting and reporting fraud and other suspicious activity. Some employees believed that only those activities resulting in a loss to the bank needed to be reported.
  • Failure to implement adequate procedures for independent testing.
  • Failure to file, and delinquent filing of, SARs. Several specific instances are described, including:
  • In spite of employee comments that certain accounts were being used to further a Ponzi scheme, no SAR was filed until two years later.
  • When AmSouth employees noted that the CFO of a corporate customer was making highly unusual transactions (he embezzled several million dollars), no SAR was filed because AmSouth suffered no loss.
  • When a municipal official contacted AmSouth about another municipal official's suspected misappropriation of $450,000, AmSouth failed to file a SAR once it learned the suspect had died.
  • AmSouth was subpoenaed seeking information on a depositor who ran a multi-million dollar fraudulent trading operation for five years. After the individual pleaded guilty, AmSouth closed his accounts, but never filed a SAR.



5/13/2004 - Riggs Bank, N.A., Washington, DC
CMP:
$25 million
Agencies: FinCEN, OCC Assets on 3/31/2004:
$5.8 Billion
The bank was cited for willful violation of the suspicious activity and currency transaction reporting, as well as the AML program requirements of the BSA and its regulations. Specific problems listed included:
  • Internal controls that were inadequate to ensure ongoing compliance with the BSA across business lines. They were not designed for the high-risk customers, products, services and international reach of the bank's business.
  • Risk matrices used in some of Riggs' divisions contained similar criteria (not tailored to line of business on a risk-graded basis)
  • The bank's customer due diligence program was not implemented in all areas consistently. The bank consequently failed to identify a large number of accounts associated with two foreign governments.
  • Enhanced due diligence was inadequate in some high-risk areas.
    • Pay on ID wire transfers
    • Dealings with check cashers and money remitters
    • International private banking
    • Embassy banking
    • Banking with politically exposed persons and non-resident aliens
  • Controls inadequate to identify suspicious transactions or to ensure timely filing of complete SARs.
  • Failure to ensure that subpoenas and other government requests were referred for investigation potential suspicious activity.
  • Failure to effectively manage its largest banking relationship, which involved a foreign government's accounts and politically exposed persons, and companies owned by those persons, in spite of warnings.
  • Failure to have effective independent testing of the bank's BSA compliance.
    • Internal audit could not verify the effectiveness or timeliness of management's corrective actions for identified deficiencies.
    • Scope of audit omitted areas of money laundering vulnerabilities, BSA compliance or SAR process.
  • BSA management was ineffective in day-to-day oversight, development and application of measures for compliance.
  • Inadequate training on monitoring and detecting suspicious activity.
  • Failure to make timely filing of 33 SARs covering $98 million in suspicious transactions.
    • Subpoenas and other matters weren't referred for investigation, delaying some SAR filings two or three years.
    • Failure to detect regular structuring of cash deposits and money order purchases; when SARs were finally filed, they were deficient.
  • Failure to detect and report suspicious cash, monetary instrument and wire activity by the governments of two foreign countries, their politically-exposed persons, and their companies.
    • In one case, the bank's relationship manager had signature authority on two accounts within the relationship.
    • This manager was inadequately supervised by the bank.
    • The manager engaged in suspicious transactions himself, including the alteration of a check, and over $1 million in wire transfers into the manager's private investment corporation account at another bank.
  • Filing of CTRs on transactions of two markets under incorrect names, involving 142 CTRs covering $7.3 dollars.
  • Filing of CTRs on accounts of a business owned by a politically exposed person with an incorrect line of business, including transactions totaling $11.5 million.

08/22/2011 - Ocean Bank - CMP
04/21/2011 - Lower Sioux Indian Community - CMP
03/23/2011 - Pacific National Bank - CMP
03/08/2011 - Victor Kaganov - CMP
03/02/2011 - Sufi Brothers d/b/a Halal Depot - CMP
02/11/2011 - Zions First National Bank - CMP
01/31/2011 - Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd. - CMP
10/06/2010 - HSBC Bank USA, N.A. - CMP
10/04/2010 - HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. - CMP
09/01/2010 - First National Community Bank - C&D
08/26/2010 - Ozark Heritage Bank, N.A. - C&D
08/26/2010 - Pinnacle Capital Markets, LLC - CMP
07/20/2010 - TCF National Bank - C&D
06/21/2010 - Intercredit Bank, NA - CMP
05/19/2010 - Security Bank, N.A. - C&D
05/10/2010 - ABN Amro Bank N.V. - Forfeiture
04/22/2010 - Eurobank - CMP
03/29/2010 - Pamrapo Savings Bank, SLA - CMP/Forfeiture
03/12/2010 - Wachovia Bank, N.A. - CMP/Forfeiture/C&D
10/26/2009 - Family B&T - Forfeiture
08/05/2009 - First Standard Bank - C&D
08/04/2009 - Heritage Bank of North Florida - C&D
04/20/2009 - Doha Bank - CMP
04/02/2009 - Rocky Mountain B&T - C&D
02/24/2009 - Bank of Westminster - C&D
02/17/2009 - Directors of Sykesville FSA - CMPs
02/12/2009 - Upstate National Bank - C&D
02/12/2009 - University Bank - C&D
01/29/2009 - First Vietnamese American Bank - C&D
01/02/2009 - E*Trade Clearing LLC et al - Fine
12/03/2008 - West Suburban Bank - C&D
11/13/2008 - Mountain Commerce Bank - C&D
11/07/2008 - Dresdner Bank AG - C&D
11/03/2008 - Blue Ridge Savings Bank, Inc. - C&D
10/27/2008 - Polk County Bank - C&D
10/24/2008 - Eastern National Bank - CMP
10/17/2008 - Fort Davis State Bank - C&D lifted 11/30/2011
10/16/2008 - Sanderson State Bank - C&D
10/07/2008 - Omni National Bank - C&D
10/02/2008 - Kenney Bank and Trust - C&D
10/02/2008 - The Bank of Harlan - C&D
09/25/2008 - First Asian Bank - C&D
09/15/2008 - Citizens Community Bank - C&D
09/09/2008 - Intercredit Bank, N.A. - C&D
08/27/2008 - Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd. - C&D
08/21/2008 - Chestatee State Bank - C&D
07/30/2008 - E*Trade Clearing LLC et al - C&D & CMP
07/09/2008 - T Bank, N.A. - C&D
06/04/2008 - Eastern National Bank - C&D
04/30/2008 - Sun Security Bank - C&D
04/22/2008 - United Bank for Africa, PLC - CMP
04/14/2008 - El Noa Noa - CMP
03/14/2008 - Independence Bank - C&D
03/10/2008 - First Regional Bank - C&D
02/29/2008 - United Bank for Africa, PLC - C&D
02/26/2008 - Wallis State Bank - C&D
02/19/2008 - Doral Bank - C&D
01/24/2008 - Sigue Corporation and Sigue, LLC - CMP
12/19/2007 - The State Bank of Lebo C&D
12/03/2007 - The Citizens Bank of Weir, Kansas - C&D
10/30/2007 - Pan American Bank - C&D
10/18/2007 - Pan Pacific Bank - C&D
10/03/2007 - American Bank and Trust Company - C&D
09/14/2007 - Union Bank of California, N.A. - CMP/C&D; Forf.
08/23/2007 - Twin City Bank C&D
08/20/2007 - Mission Bank C&D
08/10/2007 - 1st Security Bank of Washington - C&D
08/08/2007 - American Metro Bank - C&D
08/06/2007 - First BankAmericano - C&D
08/03/2007 - First American International Bank - C&D
08/03/2007 - American Express Bank Int'l & American Express Travel Related Svcs. Co. - C&D; CMP; Forf.
07/26/2007 - First State Bank of Kensington - C&D
07/19/2007 - Green Belt Bank & Trust - C&D
07/12/2007 - Central Progressive Bank - C&D
07/09/2007 - First Community Bank - C&D
07/03/2007 - Bank of Commerce - C&D
07/03/2007 - Garden Savings FCU - C&D
06/25/2007 - Orange Community Bank - C&D
05/29/2007 - Covington County Bank - C&D
05/03/2007 - Bank of Guam - C&D
05/02/2007 - United Bank for Africa, PLC - CMP
04/26/2007 - Innovative Bank, Oakland, CA - C&D
04/16/2007 - Bank of Camden, Camden, TN - C&D
03/16/2007 - Ocean Bank, Miami, FL - C&D
03/07/2007 - United Roosevelt Savings Bank - C&D
02/21/2007 - Dover N.J. Spanish American FCU - C&D
02/12/2007 - Peoples Federal S&L Assn., Sidney, OH - C&D
02/12/2007 - The International Bank of Miami, N.A. - CMP
01/29/2007 - Banc of America Investment Services, Inc. - CMP
01/18/2007 - United Bank for Africa, PLC - C&D
12/27/2006 - Beach Bank - CMP
12/14/2006 - The Foster Bank - CMP
10/31/2006 - Israel Discount Bank of New York - CMP
10/31/2006 - Douglas C. Roesch - CMP; Prohibition
07/20/2006 - Deprez's Quality Jewelry & Loans, Inc. - CMP
05/19/2006 - Liberty Bank of New York - CMP
05/09/2006 - Frosty Food Mart (Tampa, FL) - CMP
04/26/2006 - BankAtlantic - CMP
04/18/2006 - The Home Building & Loan Co., Greenfield, OH - CMP
03/24/2006 - Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., NY Branch - CMP
03/24/2006 - Tonkawa Tribe of OK & Edward Street CMPs
12/29/2005 - Oppenheimer & Company, Inc. - CMP
12/19/2005 - ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. - CMP
10/11/2005 - Banco de Chile, New York Branch - CMP
08/17/2005 - Federal Branch of Arab Bank PLC - CMP
06/20/2005 - Newton Federal Bank - CMP
02/23/2005 - City National Bank - CMP
10/12/2004 - AmSouth Bank of Birmingham - CMP
05/13/2004 - Riggs Bank, N.A. - CMP










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