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Excerpt from the SAR Activity Review
Use of United States-Based Shell Corporations and Foreign Shell Banks by Eastern Europeans to Move Money

In recent years following the public reporting of a 1999 investigation into questionable Russian-related correspondent banking activities, the publication of a 2000 General Accounting Office report entitled “Possible Money Laundering by U.S. Corporations Formed for Russian Entities,2” and the 2001 Senate hearings on the role of United States correspondent banking in international money laundering, there has been an increased focus on the money laundering risks associated with foreign-owned, United States-based shell corporations3 and foreign shell banks with no presence in the United States other than a bank account. Recent findings by the State of New York Banking Department4 have noted a steady increase in the number of Suspicious Activity Reports filed by New York banks.5 These filings report an increase in the volume of shell company wire transfer activity in both dollar amounts and the number of transactions through high-risk correspondent bank accounts. Specifically, extraordinary sums of money are passing through correspondent accounts established for Eastern European banks. The use of shell corporations and shell banks to launder money and possibly finance terrorist activities is a concern shared by government financial intelligence units worldwide. In light of the continuing concerns about foreign shell banks, in October 2001, the Congress included provisions in Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act to prohibit correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks.

Recently, FinCEN conducted a preliminary analysis of Suspicious Activity Report filings of suspicious activities involving foreign shell banks, specifically those in Eastern European countries, to determine trends and patterns in transactions before and after enactment of Section 313 and Section 319 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public Law 107-56).

Shell Corporations

Shell corporations are described as companies with no independent assets or operations of their own, which are used by their owners to conduct business dealings or maintain control of other companies. A shell corporation is registered or licensed in the state or country in which it is incorporated or established, is not traded on a securities exchange, and does not operate on its own. While shell corporations are not illegal or improper, money launderers, tax evaders and terrorist financiers have used shell corporations as a means to disguise the illicit nature of their money. They are easily established and can be interlocked with other shell corporations located all over the world. If a shell corporation is established in a jurisdiction with strict secrecy laws, it can be almost impossible to identify the owners or directors of the corporation and therefore nearly impossible to trace illicit funds back to their true owner. This is precisely the effect the launderer, terrorist financier and tax evader seeks, and is why shell corporations are an effective means of interrupting the paper trail used by investigators.6

Shell corporations typically exist only on paper. The corporation’s formation documents may list a valid bank account and little more than the name and address of the lawyer or agent handling the incorporation, some officers, and perhaps a few shareholders. When criminals seek to utilize shell corporations to disguise ownership or other illicit activity, they will provide fictitious names or nominee names on the corporate formation documents. These accounts play very important roles in illicit money movements because they can be used to receive deposits and as transfer points to the accounts of other shell corporations, legitimate businesses or individuals. The incorporation documents give shell corporations the outward appearance of legitimate businesses, allowing their bank accounts to be used to receive structured cash deposits designed to avoid currency reporting requirements.

A review of Suspicious Activity Report data indicates that suspected shell corporations, like legitimate businesses, appear to establish customer relationships with financial institutions in other countries around the world—many of which are located in Eastern European countries.
    397 Suspicious Activity Reports filed between April 1996 (the time financial institutions were mandated to file Suspicious Activity Reports) and January 2004 involved shell corporations, Eastern European countries,7 and the use of correspondent bank accounts. The aggregate violation amount reported in those 397 Suspicious Activity Report forms totaled almost $4 billion. Many of these financial institutions, in turn, had established correspondent banking relationships with financial institutions in the United States.8
USA PATRIOT Act Provisions
As required by §313(a) and §319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, on September 26, 2002, FinCEN published a final rule at 67 FR 60562, codified in 31 CFR Part 103, addressing an important subset of shell corporations: foreign shell banks. 31 CFR §103.175 defines a foreign shell bank as “a foreign bank without a physical presence in any country.” Foreign bank is defined in 31 CFR §103.11(o) as “a bank organized under foreign law,” but not including its agents, branches, or offices located in the United States. 31 CFR §103.177 imposes certain responsibilities on banks and broker-dealers operating in the United States if they maintain correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks and foreign banks. Specifically, §103.177 prohibits covered financial institutions from maintaining correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks.9

The record-keeping requirements of §103.177 implement the statutory requirement of §319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act. The portion of §103.177 that implements §319(b) requires covered financial institutions that maintain correspondent accounts for foreign banks to obtain records of the owners of those foreign banks and of their agents who are authorized to accept service of legal process. Section 319(b) is an important tool for regulators and the law enforcement community by allowing them to quickly obtain ownership information about these foreign institutions and identify individuals who can accept legal process when a subpoena for financial records must be served.

31 CFR §103.177 requires any covered financial institution that provides a correspondent account for a foreign bank to maintain records of the foreign bank’s owners and to maintain the name and address of an agent in the United States that has been designated to accept service of legal process for the foreign bank for records related to the correspondent account. 31 CFR §103.177 requires covered financial institutions to obtain from the foreign bank a certification with certain information,10 or otherwise obtain documentation of the required information. For correspondent accounts that existed on October 28, 2002, 31 CFR §103.177 requires a covered financial institution to close the correspondent account, within a commercially reasonable time, if the covered financial institution had not received the appropriate certification from the foreign bank, or otherwise obtained documentation of the required information, on or before March 31, 2003.

Suspicious Activity Report Analysis Trends for Foreign Shell Banks

Financial institutions have used Suspicious Activity Report narratives to report their assessment that suspected foreign shell banks have facilitated the movement of monies through the financial systems in the United States on behalf of alleged account holders. Domestic banks reported they were able to verify incorporation in this country for corporate entities related to possible foreign shell bank operations, but were unable to identify corporate physical locations, ownership, officers or directors. Prior to the adoption of 31 CFR §103.177, financial institutions filed Suspicious Activity Reports with narratives describing instances of foreign shell banks allegedly operating as unlicensed banks in the United States and moving funds through domestic correspondent accounts to accounts in foreign countries. After 31 CFR §103.177 was adopted, no Suspicious Activity Report filings indicate foreign shell banks operating in the United States. Ostensibly, banks would have closed these accounts to comply with the regulation. However, what financial institutions in the United States describe in some Suspicious Activity Reports as possible foreign shell banks continue to indirectly route account holders’ funds through United States correspondent accounts. Suspicious Activity Reports also reported activity conducted by alleged foreign shell banks through foreign banks’ correspondent accounts with institutions in the United States (those institutions were acting as intermediary banks.) According to regulation, domestic financial institutions must take reasonable measures to ensure that any correspondent account they establish, maintain, administer, or manage for a foreign bank is not being used by the foreign bank to provide banking services indirectly to a foreign shell bank.11

Queries by FinCEN analysts of the database housing Suspicious Activity Reports revealed some interesting facts.

  • For the period April 1996 through January 2004, 71 Suspicious Activity Reports were filed that identified activities involving foreign shell banks. Those 71 Suspicious Activity Reports reported an aggregate suspected violation amount of almost $500 million.
  • Prior to December 26, 2002, the initial effective date of 31 CFR Part 103.177, there were 30 Suspicious Activity Reports that reported suspicious activity involving alleged Eastern European12 shell banks and the use of correspondent accounts. This represents a monthly average of less than one Suspicious Activity Report.
  • 41 Suspicious Activity Reports were filed after the final rule’s December 26, 2002 effective date, with the most recent Suspicious Activity Report filed October 3, 2003.13 The monthly average over this 13-month period (January 2003-January 2004) was 3.2 Suspicious Activity Reports, not a significant increase, but an increase nevertheless.
  • The current rule extended the time for obtaining certain information concerning correspondent accounts from December 26, 2002 to March 31, 2003. During this three-month period (January-March 2003), a total of 24 Suspicious Activity Reports were filed, representing 8 Suspicious Activity Reports per month, considerably higher than before the regulation was adopted.
As noted above, financial institutions have reported and continued to report through October 2003, correspondent account activities involving suspected shell corporations and foreign shell banks in Suspicious Activity Report narratives.

Excerpted from SAR Activity Review Issue 7, page 3





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