We use JHA software for CTR tracking. We have a parameter established in an effort to identify possible structuring of transactions, so that when a check is cashed - such as a cashiers check - the CTR tracking screen appears, requiring the teller to get identifying information. A CTR will not be filed unless the amount exceeds $10,000, but the customer typically needs to be asked for their ID or other information. Does anyone see this as a concern?

It sounds reasonable to me. The second or third time you see this, it hits your structuring suspect list and you have verification that it was the same person.

That's comforting to hear, Andy. The problem our branches are having is what to say to the customer when they need to ask for the information if it isn't already on their CIF. And the customer doesn't feel they should have to give the info if they're doing something under the reportable $10,000 threshhold. They don't always seem to trust us that we aren't filing a CTR. I wasn't sure if we could (according to BSA) refuse the transaction if it's under $10K. It's an awkward situation for our frontline folks and I wondered if any other banks were doing this. Thanks!

If a customer is that concerned that you are filing a CTR for transactions under $10,000, I would count that as suspicious activity. There is no requirement for any bank to accept any transaction at anytime for a variety of reasons.

We are doing this, also. We struggle with tellers questioning the procedure pretty much every time it comes up. Don't back off! It's paid off for us in the past to have the information on file. It also fits in well with the all-important anti-money laundering program.

It's great to have the encouragement! Thanks!!

We do not yet have an online system so we use a manual system to record cash transactions over $3,000. We gather all the information necessary to complete a CTR if one would be necessary because of multiple transactions and record it on a log. We also encountered problems in the begining gathering info that we did not previously have on file, but things eventually worked themselves out. Our frontline people have been asking that we raise the limit to $5,000 but in light of the attention that BSA and AML have been getting I think we would be shooting ourselves in the foot.

We also log transactions greater than $3,000. All info is gathered as if to complete the CTR. We feel this gives us a better chance to catch multiple deposits/multiple people accurately. The information (ID) is collected and verified each time.

This is a 2 part response.

1) We also use JHA, but I was unaware that the system had a CTR Tracking Screen. Is this a separate module?

2)I don't see the request for information as a concern. As someone else mentioned, if the customer complains then I would begin to be suspicious of his reasons for doing so. This seems to be the real purpose of utilizing this feature of the JHA system-identifying suspicious activity. If you have a large percentage of customers complaining, you should take a good look at their transaction activity.

I should have clarified that we use the Vertex teller module of JHA - that's where the CTR tracking resides. And I agree whole-heartedly that a person balking at providing information should be looked into. My fear is that with the big push on sales, sales, sales and core deposits, the bankers will be afraid they'll lose the large depositors if they question them. Of course, they may lose their job if they don't!

** Rant Warning **

I guess I would be hesitant to implement any type of manual process to aggregate cash transactions under $10,000. The regulation only requires you report transaction that are known and as soon as you start tracking all these transactions manually, they become known to the bank. Now, if you have an automated system that aggregates transactions for you, it becomes a better process and much less susceptible to human error. Additionally, if you are dealing with multiple transactions, you only have to report the information that is available in an after the fact situation. Although I support the anti-money laundrying activities (I don't want to be labeled un-American), but I think banks can get a little too caught up in this and really inconvenience the 99.99999% of their legitimate customers.

***Morning/No Coffee rant warning***

I, too, support AML efforts (did you hear that, any lurking government homeland security types?). However, I believe that a customer has a legitimate right to question the collection of information for a CTR when the transaction is not CTR reportable. Don't get me wrong - I have urged management to file SARs on what I perceived to be structuring, but I liken collecting CTR information when a CTR isn't supposed to be filed to our state police conducting unlawful random traffic stops to check for license and registration. Yes, drivers are to have those documents, but the state police are going beyond the law in order to verify that they do.

If a customer's transactions are consistently below the CTR threshold, that is in itself a legitimate basis to file an SAR with whatever amount of information you have from the transactions and CIF, period.

I suspect I'm going to get blown out of the water on this one, maybe legitimately so, but I'm taking up bwest's (?) protest about banks becoming the government's uncompensated financial police. Please note that I spent half of yesterday and most of this morning dissecting the Treasury's proposed rule for customer identification, so my thinking's been dyed by immersion in this information scavenger hunt.

End of rant, for now.

I guess my response would be attributable to BSA/AML/Patriot overload. I spent all day yesterday defending our BSA/AML program to examiners. They just want more. They don't want to hear that it's not feasible to collect certain data, and they don't understand if you miss something that their examiners dug out. And they really don't care what your customers think of all this. On the other hand, they're pretty picky about your earnings, and don't understand when your efficiency ratio suffers because of the extra staff and overhead you have to add to cover all this stuff.

I think we've always been the financial police, and not only are we uncompensated, but we must pay dearly for the privilege, and we're held liable if we don't!

OK, I feel better now. I'm going back in!

Our manual process was started two years ago after we were STRONGLY critisized by the OCC for a lack of a system to detect multiple transactions and suspicious activity. I have heard others say that there is not a requirement anywhere in the BSA Regs that says you have to have such a system in place, but try to defend that position to an examiner. It is like fighting a bear with a sharp stick. Our board and our management is now very serious about compliance with BSA regs, and I am glad that I have their support.

Boy - you got me started now. I would not stand for an examiner that strongly criticizes the bank for not having sytems in place that are not reguired. Was this strong criticism in the examination report? I bet not. If it was, I would be appealing the examination finding asking for the basis. While I have worked with all the examinating agencies and been in the position where the examiners have encourage that we install an automated system, I have never seen examiners force a bank to install a manual system. I am a firm believer that we run the bank not the examiners and have pursued issues such as these as far as Washington and 9 out of 10 times the voice of reason has prevailed.

Thomasj's post got me so peeved (the examiners, not Thomasj)that I grabbed my copy of 31 CFR 103 and started combing it for anything that the examiner could have used as a basis for criticism. We've experienced the same thing in other areas. (Rant building pressure)

I'm sorry to say, but in the three years I've been doing compliance, I've turned from being a crusader for compliance to the details (no matter how inconvenient), to defender of the bank against unfounded (in statute or reg) demands by the examiners and our external auditors.

(Tha'r she blows!)
We are a small bank (no branches) that still earns its money on interest margins, not fees. We can't continue to absorb the extra expense of the increased compliance burden (which the comments to proposed rules always seem to designate as "insignificant") without imposing offsetting fees or eliminating products or services affected by the new/"improved" regs. You'd better believe that when a reg specifies that procedures are to be appropriate to our size and complexity, we are going to have the most elegantly simple procedures possible, and we're going to put the burden back onto the examiners to prove (by statute or reg) that it isn't appropriate (a term not defined). Grrrr....

Thankfully, I was not BSA Officer at the time of the exam where we were criticized (that guy left with his stuff in a cardboard box). We were criticized for an overall weakness in our BSA AML policies, and yes as far as I know we were formally criticized for not having a system in place. The examination report required our board to develop an action plan and provide the regulators with updates. The exam was appealed to no avail. I was brought in along with our compliance officer to clean things up. We would have never implemented such a time intensive process if it were not necessary to pull us out of the hot water we were in.

We kept hearing, 'but can you support that in court?" when we'd point out the unreasonableness of what the examiners were asking. Since when is that our regulators number one compliance goal? Especially with BSA compliance - the risk is from regulatory action first. Court action is in the realm of possibility, definitely, but on the top of the list?

I can fully understand why everyone is getting so "bent out of shape" on this subject and yes, I would like to join you in being ready to scream! We ARE expected to be the financial police.......with no pay and constant criticism from the regulatory agencies. We use the Vertex system as well and it helps but it is a long long way from being what is needed and yes, I have told them so. A good example is: you have a customer that takes money out of different accounts structured in different ways and Vertex doesn't always monitor them....same way if cashing checks. The tellers are taught over and over to be aware of such types of multiple transactions but hey, they don't.....when one that slips though the cracks, rears it's ugly head and no CTR was filed and you find it later ....you turn sick at your stomach. Fearing cruel and unusual punishment from the Feds.

If I see multiple transactions, tracked by Vertex or not, that indicate structuring , I recommend a SAR be filed.

I think the ID Requirements and USA Patriot Act in general have about put us all over the edge!

Maybe you have the parameter set too low. We also use this system and we have the 'non-trackable' parameters set at $7,500.

We did have it set at $5000 and raised it to $9000. The bigger problem the branch ran into was that the customer knew the >10K requirement and gave the banker grief when she asked for information at $9200. And I'm not sure he believed it when we said it wouldn't be reported. Like an earlier poster - it makes it tough when we're expected to be aware of structuring - or possible structuring - but yet have a hard time doing so. I'm thinking there must be a way to internally track "suspicious" situations where, say a customer maintains a $500 balance for a period of time. When all of a sudden he starts depositing large amounts of cash just <10K, there should be a way to track that behind the scenes and not MAKE a scene.

As many times as I've stood on the same soapbox as many of you and fought with examiners over "recommendations", the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 just won't go away. That firing shot in the AML business was very deadly. By making it a ML offense to either engage in ML or turn a blind eye to it, bankers were put on the defensive - permanently. The only defense to going to jail along with the clever launderers has been to have made reasonable efforts to watch for them and root them out of your bank.

We use Easy System's EZTeller CTR module. We have the threshold set at $3,000 (for official checks) and the system asks for a SSN on all transactions @ $3,000 and over. It holds the SSN and associated account number in a database table so if they do it again, it doesn't ask for the number. If they rack up transactions and hit the over $10,000 mark, it prompts the teller for the CTR information. It sounds like a lot, but compared to what we had in place before (32 branches filling out paper logs for every over $3,000 transaction and one person collating the info) this system is much better.

On our monetary instrument log we ask for SSN along with other information required. Or.. is SSN really required? I had a teller call me Thursday and a non-customer purchasing an Official Check would not give his SSN stating by law he was not required to give that information. I have searched BOL for information... I am still new at compliance, and just want to make it as right as possible.. Thanks for all the help

Customers often quote their version of the law.

31 CFR §103.29 Purchases of bank checks and drafts, cashier’s checks, money orders and traveler’s checks. (1) addresses accountholders.)
(2) If the purchaser does not have a deposit account with the financial institution:

(i)(A) The name and address of the purchaser;

(B) The social security number of the purchaser, or if the purchaser is an alien and does not have a social security number, the alien identification number;

(C) The date of birth of the purchaser;

(D) The date of purchase;

(E) The type(s) of instrument(s) purchased;

(F) The serial number(s) of the instrument(s) purchased; and

(G) The amount in dollars of each of the instrument(s) purchased.