straw: No, as I said before by its language it does apply to what Lewinsky did. But it's a definition that was specifically approved as defining the term for purposes of the deposition. It doesn't matter what the conventional definition might be.
Yoss, Judge Webber's order refutes both of your claims.
She thought it was clear that the definition of "sexual relations" applied to the conduct in question - the conduct of both Clinton and Lewinski: "[ Clinton's ] statements regarding whether he had ever engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky likewise were intentionally false, notwithstanding tortured definitions and interpretations of the term 'sexual relations'." In a footnote, she stated "It appears the President is asserting that Ms. Lewinsky could be having sex with him while, at the same time, he was not having sex with her."
Clearly the judge thought that was a bogus argument.
Judge Webber also addressed the issue of materiality: "contrary to numerous assertions, this Court did not rule that evidence of the Lewinsky matter was irrelevant or immaterial to the issues in the plaintiff's case. Indeed, the Court specifically acknowledged that such evidence might have been relevant to plaintiff's case . . . this Court made the decision to disallow discovery as to Ms. Lewinsky and to exclude evidence concerning her from trial not because the Court considered such evidence to be irrelevant or immaterial, but because its admission would frustrate the timely resolution of this case and cause undue expense and delay . . ."
Sounds to me like the judge considered the issue to be material.