I keep seeing an article about how the 25 largest banks are going to propose banks should have much less to do for BSA since so much of our efforts are wasted. In today's regulatory environment, do you think this will gain any traction? I was not that hopeful for major changes in BSA.

http://www.riskandcompliancehub.com/us-banks-wasting-billions-trying-to-track-crime/

Given the current climate for less regulation, they may have a shot. However, aren't these the same very large organizations that have the most BSA/AML risk given their customer base and geographies served, and probably have been penalized/cited? I'd rather see some relief for the smaller community banks that probably, as a group, have far less risk and yet it costs them proportionately more to maintain an effective BSA/AML program.

This is a hot topic in NYC and everyone who actually has some juice seems to think that some of the consumer regulations could go away or be lessened. However, the new POTUS has taken a tough stance on terrorism, so it seems unlikely that the BSA is going away.

If they would take the implied requirement away for us to report on structuring where we believe the purpose is either ignorance or tax evasion by ordinary and otherwise non-suspicious parties (such as the army of painters and roofers and construction companies and eccentric elderly people) that would reduce the burden immensely and not increase our country's risk of terrorist attack an iota.

I could get behind that.

Thank you.

To summarize: The federal functional regulatory agencies treat BSA like a game of "gotcha;" emphasizing technical compliance over encouraging banks to pursue real assistance to law enforcement. (These threads could supply an endless number of supporting anecdotes.) However, their recommendation that FinCEN, not the regulatory agencies, provide BSA's supervisory component would only apply to the mega banks.

Another recommendation is that SAR filing thresholds be raised. (Interestingly, FATF would suggest the thresholds be eliminated.) They also put forth the novel idea that required SAR filings focus on activities that law enforcement will actually act upon.

I can't find a request to lessen the compliance burden, just an acknowledgement that AML/CFT programs are important and banks should be allowed to focus on things that actually make a difference.

https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/TCH/Documents/TCH%20WEEKLY/2017/20170216_TCH_Report_AML_CFT_Framework_Redesign.pdf

I have not had the time to read through it yet.

Interesting report. There are some great points in there, but overall it seems like they're arguing over who should pay the dinner tab.

I agree. Isn't seven years (every 90 days, unless winter months) long enough to file on a roofer for dealing in cash. Hasn't the IRS had long enough to view a possible tax offender and do something? And by now the activity is no longer unusual for that customer.

I looked over the summary and I do agree with some of the points. However, PPA hit the nail on the head. I would be surprised if the federal government would be willing to entertain this due to the cost involved. Some how I find it hard to believe they have the resources to conduct the "data mining" referenced in the proposal.

About 10 years ago I floated an idea to eliminate CTRs and also SAR filing for structuring, and replace that anachronistic system with simply reporting cash in and cash out on a monthly basis, similar to what we do when we report to credit bureaus.

The criteria can be set at cumulative cash-in above a certain amount, and cumulative cash-out above a certain amount is reported along with account #, the name of the account holder, the physical address of the account, the # of cash transactions, and the TIN on the account. I indicated an accuracy tolerance of +/- $100 so we don't get silly "gotcha" findings for inadvertent errors.

Since "structuring" to avoid a CTR would no longer exist, we wouldn't need to file SARs for structuring UNLESS we noticed multiple accounts opened by the same business/.related business or individual who then kept the cumulative cash transaction below the reporting amount. You know - REAL suspicious activity.

Then the government can slice and dice the data, just like they can do know with the CTR and SAR database, and look for common addresses and such - and let financial institutors focus their resources on actual suspicious activity instead of trying to figure out if Aunt Martha has structured her bingo winnings.

Some people liked the idea, others were horrified and saw it as an invasion of privacy. Actually, it would simply replace the current system of CTR's for transactions over $10,000 and SARs for transactions just under $10,000 with a much more efficient and cost-effective system.

I'm pretty sure that FinCEN's former director would insist, as she did in several speeches, that FinCEN was well into analytics without being prompted by the mega banks. Everyone who read the acting director's speech to MLES last November probably said "Holy ----, Batman!" when they got to the part about FinCEN actually meeting with banks to organize queries and submit names for research.

One problem with that idea is that CTR's take a fair amount of hand holding because of false cash and processing errors of one kind or another. But analytics was the whole idea behind the last revision of the SAR.